Does the disenfranchisement of UK prisoners make them all Political prisoners?

[hedgehog]

That was my point earlier about civic obligations and civic rights. You are taking away a civic right: what about civic (and even legal) obligations?

In the case of removing the right to vote, what about the obligation to pay tax (on unearned income/savings) if applicable?

No taxation without representation?

Interesting just how many people are entitled to vote in the UK

http://www.aboutmyvote.co.uk/who_can_register_to_vote.aspx

This is not the same in other countries, also in the EU. I am a permanent resident of an EU country, but am not a citizen of that country and am only allowed to vote in council elections. My "civic obligations" however are the same as any national, I pay the same taxes, I live under the same rules. No, even more stringent, for if I were to disobey, I would not be imprisoned, but deported.

I don't know how this relates to "Human Rights", I do feel somewhat miffed on occasions however that I pay my taxes and hardly have a say in how the country may be run - though in all honesty, probably who is in charge at a council level has more bearing on my circumstances.

[ahinton]

It is quite interesting to note that John Stuart Mill, who considered that an individual's liberty of action should only be interfered with by the state if someone has caused harm to others, also believed that prisoners should be required to undertake hard labour for reasons of deterrence. Rather than focussing on an especially selected application of "civic death" - one that does not take into account the form of civic death felt by all through imposition - he described categories of people as "the unassimilated".

I do not believe that he thought it a requirement of the state to ensure that every individual is assimilated but rather he believed all should carry that social responsibility knowing that action could be taken if they didn't. His harm principle does not require punishment. It tells us only when punishment is permitted. However, he argues that the origin of justice rests in part in natural sentiments of revenge and that these sentiments are useful for the preservation of society. While these sentiments are not themselves moral, they are moral when subordinated to the social feeling that has punished others for the greater societal good.

Historical reference matters. Mill worried a great deal about "culture clash" and considered, among other things, whether certain actions in Indian and Japanese cultures involving honourable death, particularly to self, had the potential to harm others. Clearly he was of his time, somewhat perplexed about cultural differences because of remoteness. But I think what it shows us - and he was at least partially influenced by Bentham - is that liberty is not necessarily based on the laissez faire or equality across the board. Permissions must address cause and consequence. That is to say that authority can be quite draconian without this being wholly incompatible with the objective of promoting individual freedom in law-abiding society. Votes for the unassimilated can oppress us.

You have clearly given much though to the matter from what you write here. However, John Stuart Mill has been dead for nearly 140 years and, at the time of his death, only males aged 21 or over were entitled to vote - i.e. a far smaller minority of the adult population than is entitled to vote today; his thoughts on the subject must therefore be read and understood in the context of voting rights being denied to far more British adults than is the case now and, since one could therefore argue that his invented category "the unassimilated" included all of those who were at the time denied entitlement to vote, the validity of that category in that context is not today what it was then.

You conclude that "he believed all should carry that social responsibility knowing that action could be taken if they didn't", yet voting is itself a civic responsibility, even though not one whose omission is punishable under law. You then add that "he argues that the origin of justice rests in part in natural sentiments of revenge and that these sentiments are useful for the preservation of society"; this seems to me to fly in the face of the very principles of what is supposed to have identified British justice as the most fair and advanced of its kind even before the days of Bentham and Mill and it clearly has no place either as the fundamental constituent of present-day British justice as which he perceived it or indeed as acceptable under the EU human rights legislation whose establishment he could not possibly have predicted. You then surmise that "while these sentiments are not themselves moral, they are moral when subordinated to the social feeling that has punished others for the greater societal good"; it's not entirely clear whether you're seeking to act as a mouthpiece for Mill's ideas here or offering your own take on them here, but logic demands that "these sentiments" must either be moral or not and, if so "subordinated" (as you put it), any possible "morality" perceived to be inherent in them is accordingly "subordinated" likewise, thereby undermining any weight that they might otherwise have carried.

Even if, as you suggest, "liberty is not necessarily based on the laissez(-)faire or equality across the board" and that "permissions must address cause and consequence" (and these things are, after all, personal viewpoints rather than incontrovertible facts), that does not of itself signify - let alone justify - that, when punishment by incarceration is dispensed by a Court, all liberties - or even just voting rights - be removed from prisoners. You then submit that "authority can be quite draconian without this being wholly incompatible with the objective of promoting individual freedom in law-abiding society", which, in theory, at least, may be argued to be true; however, since the fact that no two judges can necessarily be relied upon to dispense the same punishments for the same crimes committed under broadly identical circumstances reveals that the extent of the "draconian" nature of those punishments will vary from case to case, the extent of such compatibility "with the object of promoting individual freedom" is likewise seen to be a variable rather than a constant and, given also that individuals' personal views on what constitutes "freedom" in a law-abiding society will likewise vary to some degree, the very relevance of the notion of "draconian authority" vis-à-vis promotion of liberty is undermined to the point at which, once again, it provides no justification for the specific withdrawal of voting rights from prisoners.

At least you admit that Mill was "clearly...of his time" and "somewhat perplexed about cultural differences because of remoteness"; he and his views are far more remote from contemporary British society than they might have seemed in his day, just as is the very nature and constitutional make-up that society remote from that in which he lived.

[ahinton]

That was my point earlier about civic obligations and civic rights. You are taking away a civic right: what about civic (and even legal) obligations?

In the case of removing the right to vote, what about the obligation to pay tax (on unearned income/savings) if applicable?

No taxation without representation?

This is all wholly pertinent here; let's see what answers might (or might not!) be forthcoming...

[Lateralthinking1]

That was my point earlier about civic obligations and civic rights. You are taking away a civic right: what about civic (and even legal) obligations?

In the case of removing the right to vote, what about the obligation to pay tax (on unearned income/savings) if applicable?

No taxation without representation?

The concept of no taxation without representation goes back to the 1700s and it was focussed on America. It addresses a state's right to take from an individual who has no influence on governance in the absence of any give. Here in Britain in the 21st Century we have a sophisticated system of giving from any takings in terms of services etc. The prison service is one of many things given.

Prisoners, as well as wider society, have the benefits of that service. By rights, a prison should be helpful to them as well as to others. Additionally, benefits can be claimed by prisoners in certain circumstances and there is a brief payment to all prisoners on release. Prisoners will have support from the NHS if needed and other services during their stay, ie national defence as we do.

So it is an entirely different situation. This is certainly not a systemic grab from the many for the benefit of the few without representation. Taxes are payable beforehand and afterwards. Services are accessible beforehand and afterwards. Votes are possible beforehand and afterwards. A prisoner is effectively only "partially in absentia" for a period, supported by the state.

In the US where a prisoner has income and no one to file his return, payment of any tax is suspended until release. It may be the same here. Just as he might spend six months in prison when no elections take place and hence have equal representation, he may have tax to pay later. There isn't a huge difference. For the vast majority the payment of tax will not be relevant in any case.

[Lateralthinking1]

To ahinton, I studied Mill and, indeed, Rousseau in the early 1980s. I had to remind myself this afternoon of some of the arguments and much of my contribution, though not all, is a quote either from Mill or experienced academics. The following were not mine:

"he argues that the origin of justice rests in part in natural sentiments of revenge and that these sentiments are useful for the preservation of society"

"while these sentiments are not themselves moral, they are moral when subordinated to the social feeling that has punished others for the greater societal good"

My understanding is that "the unassimilated" - and how the present day suggests the need for a new category "the under-assimilated" - were considered in relation to compliance with the law and not to exclusion from democracy. Clearly it was then a different world but I think the key principles are still naturally to be assessed as self-standing. One could go any which way in reviewing them in the light of participatory elections. There is a strong argument that individuals have more of a buy-in to assimilation for having the vote and that being unassimilated has less justification following these involving developments.

My own view, for what it is worth, is that criminality in most instances has a cause. That cause is frequently the impacts of other people, whether in an individual's background or indeed the actions of the state. I also believe that some people just have bad luck. Additionally, I tend to think that the law is indeed an ass in some respects and that a few prisoners have morality on their side. Situations are highly complex and there are many grey areas. I tend to find the very concept of prisons quite difficult.

That is not to say that any individual does not have a responsibility to himself and other people to comply with the law to the best of his ability or that the law should not be enforced if he doesn't do so. A society cannot be orderly in the absence of law, however questionable we might think some of it might be. I have now expressed on many occasions on this thread how I believe we don't go anywhere near enough to help with rehabilitation. This is particularly true of ex-offenders. Much of my reasoning is based on the points I have made in the paragraph above. As for Mill's view on a desire for revenge, I think he makes a very solid point about human nature. It would be unreal to consider the matter of votes for prisoners while pretending that away.

[ahinton]

To ahinton, I studied Mill and, indeed, Rousseau in the early 1980s. I had to remind myself this afternoon of some of the arguments and much of my contribution, though not all, is a quote either from Mill or experienced academics. The following were not mine:

"he argues that the origin of justice rests in part in natural sentiments of revenge and that these sentiments are useful for the preservation of society"

"while these sentiments are not themselves moral, they are moral when subordinated to the social feeling that has punished others for the greater societal good"

Thank you for clarifying that.

My understanding is that "the unassimilated" - and how the present day suggests the need for a new category "the under-assimilated" - were considered in relation to compliance with the law and not to exclusion from democracy. Clearly it was then a different world but I think the key principles are still naturally to be assessed as self-standing. One could go any which way in reviewing them in the light of participatory elections. There is a strong argument that individuals have more of a buy-in to assimilation for having the vote and that being unassimilated has less justification following these involving developments.

That's all very well but how does your statement here influence your view about whether or not prisoners should have the vote?

My own view, for what it is worth, is that criminality in most instances has a cause. That cause is frequently the impacts of other people, whether in an individual's background or indeed the actions of the state. I also believe that some people just have bad luck. Additionally, I tend to think that the law is indeed an ass in some respects and that a few prisoners have morality on their side. Situations are highly complex and there are many grey areas. I tend to find the very concept of prisons quite difficult.

Whilst I am broadly in agreement with you here, I feel inclined to repeat "that's all very well but how does your statement here influence your view about whether or not prisoners should have the vote?"

That is not to say that any individual does not have a responsibility to himself and other people to comply with the law to the best of his ability or that the law should not be enforced if he doesn't do so. A society cannot be orderly in the absence of law, however questionable we might think some of it might be. I have now expressed on many occasions on this thread how I believe we don't go anywhere near enough to help with rehabilitation. This is particularly true of ex-offenders. Much of my reasoning is based on the points I have made in the paragraph above.

I cannot but agree with you on these points but, yet again, I have to ask "how does your statement here influence your view about whether or not prisoners should have the vote?"

As for Mill's view on a desire for revenge, I think he makes a very solid point about human nature. It would be unreal to consider the matter of votes for prisoners while pretending that away.

This is where I part company with you, for if we've learned nothing and failed to progress as a consequence since Mill's day, then it would be too soon to try to have any kind of rational argument along the lines of the subject here and we should all be thoroughly ashamed of ourselves in general terms and, in particular, of our failure to confront past views of the value and validity of what was once ascribed to "human nature" as what now seems like a very lame excuse for failure to address whether something could in fact be done about it; fortunately, however, I do not share your view that this might be the case.

[Lateralthinking1]

Ahinton - Thank you for your reply. I genuinely appreciate your considered responses. However, this is post number 202 on this thread and my 32nd. If I have not managed to convey my position successfully by now, it is never going to happen. I feel that I have set out my position pretty well and that the main issue is that people are just bound to disagree on such things. That's fine.

It is probably true that Freud and Jung no longer occupy the places they once did in psychology; Keynes and Friedman are not the main authorities on economics; and the Book of Genesis is not accepted in its entirety by the Church of England. That doesn't mean that we should just forget them. I feel that 90% of the errors that are made in 2012 relate to decisions being taken with no background or depth and with interests only in next Wednesday. My post 158 addresses the why nots. I can't add anything more.

I am sorry that I can't help you. I have limited ability but feel quite sure on where I stand and I have tried to do my best.

[ahinton]

Ahinton - Thank you for your reply. I genuinely appreciate your considered responses. However, this is post number 202 on this thread and my 32nd. If I have not managed to convey my position successfully by now, it is never going to happen. I feel that I have set out my position pretty well and that the main issue is that people are just bound to disagree on such things. That's fine.

It is probably true that Freud and Jung no longer occupy the places they once did in psychology; Keynes and Friedman are not the main authorities on economics; and the Book of Genesis is not accepted in its entirety by the Church of England. That doesn't mean that we should just forget them. I feel that 90% of the errors that are made in 2012 relate to decisions being taken with no background or depth and with interests only in next Wednesday. My post 158 addresses the why nots. I can't add anything more.

I am sorry that I can't help you. I have limited ability but feel quite sure on where I stand and I have tried to do my best.

And you've succeeded as far as is reasonably possible. You have sufficient ability. You don't need to help me as I've not asked you to. I don't think that we should "forget" - in the sense of entirely ignoring as though they'd never existed - the Book of Genesis, Freud, Jung, Marx, Keynes, Friedman and all the rest but at the same time it is important to recognise that things have not only moved since their days but are also moving ever faster.

That's all, really. My only remaining concern in the specific context of the thread is that, despite your efforts and your significant and interesting points, you have still not managed to convince that prisoners should continue to be denied the vote in Britain.

[Lateralthinking1]

And you've succeeded as far as is reasonably possible. You have sufficient ability. You don't need to help me as I've not asked you to. I don't think that we should "forget" - in the sense of entirely ignoring as though they'd never existed - the Book of Genesis, Freud, Jung, Marx, Keynes, Friedman and all the rest but at the same time it is important to recognise that things have not only moved since their days but are also moving ever faster.

That's all, really. My only remaining concern in the specific context of the thread is that, despite your efforts and your significant and interesting points, you have still not managed to convince that prisoners should continue to be denied the vote in Britain.

That should surely read "you have still not managed to convince me that prisoners should continue to be denied the vote in Britain"? Frenchfrank often refers to the significance of the wider readership. Many don't ever write a word on the forum.

[Pabmusic]

I'm with Bentham in thinking that the concept of imprescriptible 'natural rights' is 'nonsense on stilts' -

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Natural_and_legal_rights

Whether Bentham may have been right or not, our present notion of human rights stems from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, passed by the UN in 1948. This is a public statement of what the signatory states do accept to be the 'imprescriptible natural rights' you mentioned. The 1950 European Convention on Human Rights was Europe's response to how the Universal Declaration would be administered. I posted the Universal Declaration in post 100, and the European Convention in post 60.

The underlying idea is that these rights belong to everyone from birth, whatever a particular government might do. And this is not a theoretical idea but a practical, enforceable one. The ECHR provides the enforcement mechanism in the case of the 47 states of the Council of Europe.

[ahinton]

That should surely read "you have still not managed to convince me that prisoners should continue to be denied the vote in Britain"? Frenchfrank often refers to the significance of the wider readership. Many don't ever write a word on the forum.

Perhaps - perhaps not; who can say; it might have better been written differently, I'll grant you that much, but is the impression that you have gleaned from the discussion so far that I am probably out on a limb here in believing that prisoners should have voting rights restored to them except in cases such as those convicted of electoral fraud?

[ahinton]

Whether Bentham may have been right or not, our present notion of human rights stems from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, passed by the UN in 1948. This is a public statement of what the signatory states do accept to be the 'imprescriptible natural rights' you mentioned. The 1950 European Convention on Human Rights was Europe's response to how the Universal Declaration would be administered. I posted the Universal Declaration in post 100, and the European Convention in post 60.

The underlying idea is that these rights belong to everyone from birth, whatever a particular government might do. And this is not a theoretical idea but a practical, enforceable one. The ECHR provides the enforcement mechanism in the case of the 47 states of the Council of Europe.

Exactly; thank you for posting this and reminding us of that vital piece of relatively recent (but not all that recent) history. I am tempted to wonder whether those who would argue with it and prefer to refer back to those such as Bentham, Mill and the like harbour either contempt or at the very least suspicion of UDHR, the European Convention and the ECHR. The might still be some room for reasoned argument about the practical meaning and appropriate use of the specific term "natural rights", but that does not of itself undermine the general principles involved. All of what you refer to here rose out of the ashes of two world wars, the like of which the Benthams and Mills fortunately never faced. If the thoughts of the Benthams and Mills are to be regarded as still holding as good today as they did in their own times, we would not have progressed very far.

Incidentally, "Eastern Europeans" were mentioned upthread and I noted that by no means all such people are part of EU; the Council of Europe demonstrates this far more effectively than I did, in that it includes not only the nations that I mentioned but also Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and the entire Russian Federation among others (a total of 20 of which are not yet part of EU), an expanded view of Europe that stretches from Atlantic to Pacific and which at some point in the future might well expand again southwards to incorporate the nations of the Middle East and north Africa. OK, the grouping so far represents not many more than 1 in every 8 of the world's population and views about the matter under discussion here have admittedly by no means yet been harmonised between all member states, but its underlying thrust is clear, even if certain little Englanders, contemporary Knuts and others of similar ostrich-like persuasion continue sadly to try to hang on to a belief that the ways in which at least some things were done judicially before the 20th century were better than having such an unwieldy phenomenon as the UDHR.

[Pabmusic]

Exactly; thank you for posting this and reminding us of that vital piece of relatively recent (but not all that recent) history. I am tempted to wonder whether those who would argue with it and prefer to refer back to those such as Bentham, Mill and the like harbour either contempt or at the very least suspicion of UDHR, the European Convention and the ECHR. The might still be some room for reasoned argument about the practical meaning and appropriate use of the specific term "natural rights", but that does not of itself undermine the general principles involved. All of what you refer to here rose out of the ashes of two world wars, the like of which the Benthams and Mills fortunately never faced. If the thoughts of the Benthams and Mills are to be regarded as still holding as good today as they did in their own times, we would not have progressed very far.

Incidentally, "Eastern Europeans" were mentioned upthread and I noted that by no means all such people are part of EU; the Council of Europe demonstrates this far more effectively than I did, in that it includes not only the nations that I mentioned but also Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and the entire Russian Federation among others (a total of 20 of which are not yet part of EU), an expanded view of Europe that stretches from Atlantic to Pacific and which at some point in the future might well expand again southwards to incorporate the nations of the Middle East and north Africa. OK, the grouping so far represents not many more than 1 in every 8 of the world's population and views about the matter under discussion here have admittedly by no means yet been harmonised between all member states, but its underlying thrust is clear, even if certain little Englanders, contemporary Knuts and others of similar ostrich-like persuasion continue sadly to try to hang on to a belief that the ways in which at least some things were done judicially before the 20th century were better than having such an unwieldy phenomenon as the UDHR.

Excellently put. We need to remember that the ECHR is nothing to do with the EU, but rather with the Council of Europe, which oversaw the largely successful and peaceful reconstruction of western Europe after WW2. Since the fall of communism, more nations have joined and ratified the Convention. As I said in an earlier post, who would have thought that the likes of Russia would one day sign up to the Convention? The connexion with the EU is that all the EU member states have to adopt the Convention.

I do get irritated when people question 'human rights' as if it's a somehow a wishy-washy 'liberal' idea that can mean anything to anyone. It's actually a quite successful attempt to put right some of the wrongs that led to a world war.

[ahinton]

Excellently put. We need to remember that the ECHR is nothing to do with the EU, but rather with the Council of Europe, which oversaw the largely successful and peaceful reconstruction of western Europe after WW2. Since the fall of communism, more nations have joined and ratified the Convention. As I said in an earlier post, who would have thought that the likes of Russia would one day sign up to the Convention? The connexion with the EU is that all the EU member states have to adopt the Convention.

I do get irritated when people question 'human rights' as if it's a somehow a wishy-washy 'liberal' idea that can mean anything to anyone. It's actually a quite successful attempt to put right some of the wrongs that led to a world war.

I get irritated by that, too. Of course it's also worth bearing in mind that just because certain countries happen not to be signatories to the Council of Europe (principally by virtue of their being geographically outside Europe) it doesn't necessarily follow that they do not adopt as a matter of principle any of the tenets of the European Convention; justice has changed radically in many countries since the example of the Council of Europe was made manifest - more so in some notions than others, of course (and there are still some that seem to be wilfully ignorant - and even in some cases broadly contemptuous - of what it seeks to stand for) and, just as two world wars have turned the post-WWII world into something that would be largely unrecognisable to most 18th and 19th century thinkers, the ways in which we all expect to deal with judicial issues of all kinds have inevitably changed and that change continues to accelerate in accordance with the accelerations of almost all other aspects of life, as indeed it should and must.

The earlier reference to the perceived validity of the rôle of vengeance in certain judicial issues is perhaps one of the more glaring examples of what we would have failed to learn had we not overtaken this antediluvian and socially regressive and divisive notion.

The prospect that Iran (to my mind a south eastern European country and one with a great history) might one day sign up to the European Convention might seem woefully remote but I would not discount it as a possibility.

[MrGongGong]

I do get irritated when people question 'human rights' as if it's a somehow a wishy-washy 'liberal' idea that can mean anything to anyone. It's actually a quite successful attempt to put right some of the wrongs that led to a world war.

and

Incidentally, "Eastern Europeans" were mentioned upthread and I noted that by no means all such people are part of EU;

this has become a bit of a "catch all" phase, when I first went to Hungary I said to someone I met that I had never been to "Eastern Europe" before, "you still haven't" was the reply this is "Central Europe" ......