Xenakis, Iannis

[ahinton]

Exactly. And none of those statements are in mutual contradiction. He talks about the transformative power of music, its consciousness-expanding potential, not about communicating feelings.

Whilst I am uncertain that the transformative power of music and its consciousness-expanding potential are necessarily in and of themselves inherently contradictory of the notion of its ability to communicate feelings, there is no doubt that Xenakis knew of what he spoke/wrote here.

[Mandryka]

Whilst I am uncertain that the transformative power of music and its consciousness-expanding potential are necessarily in and of themselves inherently contradictory of the notion of its ability to communicate feelings, there is no doubt that Xenakis knew of what he spoke/wrote here.

What I am uncertain about is how, exactly, music can be transformative other than by stirring emotions.

I note also that IX talks about how music needs to use “all means of expression” to execute its function.

[Joseph K]

how, exactly, music can be transformative other than by stirring emotions.

It can stir the imagination, requiring different and particular forms of figurative speech to describe how it alters ones consciousness. And it can spontaneously give more sensuous kinds of pleasure, which I would just describe as a nice feeling in the head.

[Mandryka]

It can stir the imagination, requiring different and particular forms of figurative speech to describe how it alters ones consciousness. .

You mean a response to a piece of music along the lines of "it makes me think of . . . " Karajan playing the opening of Dvorak 9 makes me think of the Germans in gun-boots marching in to Czechoslovakia in 1939, that sort of thing. This seems even more likely to be context dependent than affekts.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=P_1N6_O254g&ab_channel=BerlinerPhilharmoniker

Or better -- and true for me -- Prokofiev's Montagues and Capulets dance always makes me think of sex, presumably some weird association in my past

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ljOMXgfflRI&ab_channel=TheWickedNorth

[Bryn]

Not sure if this had been mentioned but in addition to the new remasterings of the Marius Constant recordings, there is also a new one of 2 works with Charles Bruck at the helm, i.e. Xenakis: Terretektorh & Nomos Gamma: https://www.qobuz.com/us-en/album/xe.../sprct7nffk2cb

Images of the original LP sleeve, disc labels, and programme notes can be found here: https://www.discogs.com/release/1403...rh-Nomos-Gamma

[Joseph K]

You mean a response to a piece of music along the lines of "it makes me think of . . . " Karajan playing the opening of Dvorak 9 makes me think of the Germans in gun-boots marching in to Czechoslovakia in 1939, that sort of thing. This seems even more likely to be context dependent than affekts.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=P_1N6_O254g&ab_channel=BerlinerPhilharmoniker

Or better -- and true for me -- Prokofiev's Montagues and Capulets dance always makes me think of sex, presumably some weird association in my past

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ljOM...TheWickedNorth

Sort of, but more abstract rather than the concrete examples you give. That perhaps means description in more vague terms; of course music can be powerful, and I may grasp for terms to try to capture in words even slightly the totality of something that may profoundly alter my consciousness, but necessarily fail owing to the essentially mysterious and ineffable nature of it. But I like Xenakis's analogy of a boulder - that seems more amenable to what some music might be 'about' rather than an invasion or sex - though I guess these are what some music is about, but was not what I had in mind.

[RichardB]

Sort of, but more abstract rather than the concrete examples you give. That perhaps means description in more vague terms; of course music can be powerful, and I may grasp for terms to try to capture in words even slightly the totality of something that may profoundly alter my consciousness, but necessarily fail owing to the essentially mysterious and ineffable nature of it.

Two personal remarks: firstly, the way I talk about music (like that of Xenakis for example) might give the impression that my response to it is more "intellectual" than "emotional" (though the difference between the two is very difficult to pin down actually), but this really just comes down to the fact that "translating" that response into words at all means that the ineffable aspects are somewhat marginalised; secondly, there was a time when I scattered verbal expressive indications through my scores (the first part of Tract has 47 of them in 12 minutes, including my favourite "clumsy and unimpressive" ), but at a certain point these became sparser and finally disappeared altogether - this isn't because the music has become inexpressive (at least I hope it hasn't) but because its expressive identity is much too complex for even a brief suggestion to be put into words. What interests me is to create an open situation where listeners confront themselves rather than being told explicitly or implicitly what they ought to be thinking; and I think this approach owes as much to Xenakis as to anyone else. But it's also important to remember that music in the lazz tradition is very much about telling one's own story (for obvious historical reasons), and that's a strand that's woven into the music too. I can appreciate (having been a participant, for example, in the "poll tax riot" in London in March 1990) what Xenakis means when he talks about the indelible impression made on him by the sonic transformations experienced in mass protests. But that experience was a portal through which a new music could be discovered (as with the relationship of innovations in jazz to the oppression of African-Americans). Sorry, rambling a bit there.

[Joseph K]

Two personal remarks: firstly, the way I talk about music (like that of Xenakis for example) might give the impression that my response to it is more "intellectual" than "emotional" (though the difference between the two is very difficult to pin down actually), but this really just comes down to the fact that "translating" that response into words at all means that the ineffable aspects are somewhat marginalised; secondly, there was a time when I scattered verbal expressive indications through my scores (the first part of Tract has 47 of them in 12 minutes, including my favourite "clumsy and unimpressive" ), but at a certain point these became sparser and finally disappeared altogether - this isn't because the music has become inexpressive (at least I hope it hasn't) but because its expressive identity is much too complex for even a brief suggestion to be put into words. What interests me is to create an open situation where listeners confront themselves rather than being told explicitly or implicitly what they ought to be thinking; and I think this approach owes as much to Xenakis as to anyone else. But it's also important to remember that music in the lazz tradition is very much about telling one's own story (for obvious historical reasons), and that's a strand that's woven into the music too. I can appreciate (having been a participant, for example, in the "poll tax riot" in London in March 1990) what Xenakis means when he talks about the indelible impression made on him by the sonic transformations experienced in mass protests. But that experience was a portal through which a new music could be discovered (as with the relationship of innovations in jazz to the oppression of African-Americans). Sorry, rambling a bit there.

Thanks for this. I agree regarding the false separation of intellect and emotion - these often can't be separated, particularly in a person's response to music (though I admit that I have used a similar trope to this - 'visceral' vs. 'cerebral' ).

[Mandryka]

I think the distinction between intellectual and emotional mental states is simple. Intellectual mental states have a truth value, emotional ones don’t.

I am wary of talk about ineffability. Basically, I believe that if you can’t say it in language it isn’t real, and you’re deluding yourself if you think it is. In fact I’d go further, I’d say that if you can’t say it in a sentence with assertability conditions, then it’s not meaningful (even though it may have the syntax of a meaningful proposition.)

[RichardB]

there is also a new one of 2 works with Charles Bruck at the helm, i.e. Xenakis: Terretektorh & Nomos Gamma

Sounding pretty good for its age. Did you see Nomos Gamma at the Proms a few years ago (improbably coupled with Shostakovich 9)?

[RichardB]

I believe that if you can’t say it in language it isn’t real, and you’re deluding yourself if you think it is.

That would seem to make most creative musicians and visual artists pretty delusional!

[Mandryka]

That would seem to make most creative musicians and visual artists pretty delusional!

And many more people than that. It’s easy to think that you’ve said something meaningful, or indeed had a meaningful thought, when in fact you haven’t thought anything with a clear content at all. The illusion of “saying something meaningful” - saying something which is true or false, something for which there are assertibility conditions - comes from the fact that you’ve uttered a syntactically well formed sentence.


What I’m saying is not original, by the way. It’s a pretty central way of thinking in England and America - from Wittgenstein and Willard Quine to John McDowell, Michael Dummett and onwards. I know less about European ideas in logic, I wonder sometimes whether Foucault would agree with what I wrote though, or indeed Kant and Aristotle.

[RichardB]

It’s a pretty central way of thinking in England and America - from Wittgenstein and Willard Quine to John McDowell, Michael Dummett and onwards.

Yes, I'm quite aware of that, but I don't agree with it. It's a point of view that seeks a tidy and well-defined framework for thinking by ignoring everything but an infinitesimal fraction of reality, that which can be expressed in well-formed statements. That isn't even true of mathematics, as Gödel proved.

[Mandryka]

Yes, I'm quite aware of that, but I don't agree with it. It's a point of view that seeks a tidy and well-defined framework for thinking by ignoring everything but an infinitesimal fraction of reality, that which can be expressed in well-formed statements.

It’s not ignoring things which cannot be said in well formed statements. It is saying that some well formed statements are contentful and some only appear to have content.

You’re begging the question when you say that it’s ignoring a fraction of reality - that’s exactly what the discussion turns on - the relation between thought and reality.

[RichardB]

It’s not ignoring things which cannot be said in well formed statements. It is saying that some well formed statements are contentful and some only appear to have content.

You’re begging the question when you say that it’s ignoring a fraction of reality - that’s exactly what the discussion turns on - the relation between thought and reality.

I've lost you completely now, but never mind.