Smithsonian Network The Battle of Jutland

[richardfinegold]

The Smithsonian Network had an episode on the Battle of Jutland that I enjoyed. One of the ironies of WWI is that one of the precipitating causes was the Naval Arms Race between Imperial Germany and the British (which then spurred other Nations to build up their own fleets), yet during the four year conflict there was only one large scale Naval Confrontation. The British Admiral Jellicoe suffered the loss of twice as many men and sailors as the Germans, and a British Public that was hoping for another Trafalgar was disappointed.
The show follows an expedition that uses modern sonar and computer imaging to show how the battle unfolded and the how the ships met their end. It also shows how the British Vice Admiral had doctored navigational charts in the 1920s to cover up his own mistakes.
Strategically the British were the long term winners, as by preserving the bulk of their fleet they were able to maintain the blockade on Germany which contributed to Germany losing the will to fight two years later.

[LeMartinPecheur]

The Smithsonian Network had an episode on the Battle of Jutland that I enjoyed. One of the ironies of WWI is that one of the precipitating causes was the Naval Arms Race between Imperial Germany and the British (which then spurred other Nations to build up their own fleets), yet during the four year conflict there was only one large scale Naval Confrontation. The British Admiral Jellicoe suffered the loss of twice as many men and sailors as the Germans, and a British Public that was hoping for another Trafalgar was disappointed.
The show follows an expedition that uses modern sonar and computer imaging to show how the battle unfolded and the how the ships met their end. It also shows how the British Vice Admiral had doctored navigational charts in the 1920s to cover up his own mistakes.
Strategically the British were the long term winners, as by preserving the bulk of their fleet they were able to maintain the blockade on Germany which contributed to Germany losing the will to fight two years later.

A fair summary rfg. It sounds like you were watching a fairly recent documentary (BBC?), made this side of the pond, that I've seen.

[Frances_iom]

It was a close run thing as Britain almost ran out of food at end of 1917 thanks to the very effective U-boats against which the admiralty had not prepared prewar and like today's Covid19 campaign tried anything - the Germans also had better control over the air - again like today totally insufficient investment in engineering skills and education.

[richardfinegold]

A fair summary rfg. It sounds like you were watching a fairly recent documentary (BBC?), made this side of the pond, that I've seen.

Did the BBC documentary feature Jellicoe’s grandson?

[richardfinegold]

It was a close run thing as Britain almost ran out of food at end of 1917 thanks to the very effective U-boats against which the admiralty had not prepared prewar and like today's Covid19 campaign tried anything - the Germans also had better control over the air - again like today totally insufficient investment in engineering skills and education.

I think the air war went somewhat back and forth, as the technology was young and the sides would one up each other with improvements to gain temporary advantage. Britain had a pitiful air presence at the beginning. They were still better than the U.S., which didn’t move to make a contract with the Wright Brothers until in desperation, the brothers were on the verge on concluding a deal with Germany

[LeMartinPecheur]

Did the BBC documentary feature Jellicoe’s grandson?

Sorry Richard, can't recall.

[richardfinegold]

Sorry Richard, can't recall.

I’m just curious if the Smithsonian series makes its own content or if it also borrows from abroad

[Barbirollians]

I’m just curious if the Smithsonian series makes its own content or if it also borrows from abroad

The German navy were very lucky to escape in the night as I recall. The biggest story was the disaster of the British battle cruisers exploding because their shell delivery system allowed flash shocks into the magazine which led to the Queen Mary , Inflexible and Indefatigable 's munitions igniting and the ships blowing up .

[Historian]

It also shows how the British Vice Admiral had doctored navigational charts in the 1920s to cover up his own mistakes.

For anyone who is really, really interested in why Jutland was fought by the Royal Navy in the way it was (including the issue mentioned above by rfg) there is a very detailed study by Andrew Gordon https://www.amazon.co.uk/Rules-Game-...6076733&sr=1-1 [The Rules of the Game: Jutland and British Naval Command]. I found it fascinating and very convincing but it does go into a lot of detail.

While it's hard to argue that Jutland was a tactical victory for the Royal Navy, rfg's final point is the crucial one: the day after Jutland British control of the North Sea (and hence the security from invasion as well as the blockade) continued unimpaired. The Imperial German Navy never challenged the control of the British surface fleet again.

[LMcD]

The German navy were very lucky to escape in the night as I recall. The biggest story was the disaster of the British battle cruisers exploding because their shell delivery system allowed flash shocks into the magazine which led to the Queen Mary , Inflexible and Indefatigable 's munitions igniting and the ships blowing up .

Both Smithsonian and PBS America broadcast BBC documentaries. I'm recording 2 from PBS today: Cockleshell Heroes and Operation Crossbow.

[richardfinegold]

The German navy were very lucky to escape in the night as I recall. The biggest story was the disaster of the British battle cruisers exploding because their shell delivery system allowed flash shocks into the magazine which led to the Queen Mary , Inflexible and Indefatigable 's munitions igniting and the ships blowing up .

Is the term “Battle Cruiser” synonymous with Dreadnought?
Regarding the point about the ships laden with munitions essentially contributing to their own destruction, I was struck by the parallel between
that and the fate of the four Japanese aircraft carriers that were sunk in WWII at the Battle of Midway. At the time they were attacked they had just launched their own planes and their flight decks were awash with oil and refueling tanks, rendering them highly flammable and contributing to their own destruction.
It is one of the ironies of WWI that the pre 1914 Naval Arms race was such a large inciting factor, with the prestige being measured by the big battleships, but that the submarine, whose pre war status amongst even the German High Command was one of near contempt, became the decisive weapon

[richardfinegold]

Both Smithsonian and PBS America broadcast BBC documentaries. I'm recording 2 from PBS today: Cockleshell Heroes and Operation Crossbow.

Thank you for that clarification.

[Historian]

Is the term “Battle Cruiser” synonymous with Dreadnought?

Not quite. HMS Dreadnought was a step change in battleship design, being much more heavily armed and armoured than her (pre-dreadnought) predecessors which were rendered obsolete. Battlecruisers were a later development, trading armoured protection for increased speed while retaining heavy calibre guns. The theory was that they could outrun anything which could outgun them (i.e. conventional battleships) while outgunning anything which could catch them (i.e. armoured cruisers). This did not stop both sides using them in the battle-line which was an obvious risk.

The British battlecruisers mentioned above had a fatal design flaw. When an enemy shell penetrated a German battlecruiser turret, the blast blew shut the doors leading to the magazine, thus preventing a catastrophic chain-reaction. The British battlecruisers were not designed in the same way, with the result that three of them were destroyed by the flash from a hit on a turret communicated fatally to a magazine.

[richardfinegold]

Not quite. HMS Dreadnought was a step change in battleship design, being much more heavily armed and armoured than her (pre-dreadnought) predecessors which were rendered obsolete. Battlecruisers were a later development, trading armoured protection for increased speed while retaining heavy calibre guns. The theory was that they could outrun anything which could outgun them (i.e. conventional battleships) while outgunning anything which could catch them (i.e. armoured cruisers). This did not stop both sides using them in the battle-line which was an obvious risk.

The British battlecruisers mentioned above had a fatal design flaw. When an enemy shell penetrated a German battlecruiser turret, the blast blew shut the doors leading to the magazine, thus preventing a catastrophic chain-reaction. The British battlecruisers were not designed in the same way, with the result that three of them were destroyed by the flash from a hit on a turret communicated fatally to a magazine.

Yes, the documentary show 5 Battle Cruisers in a line, peeling off from the rest of the fleet and making a sharp Southeast turn, engaging catastrophically with the German fleet and then the survivors attempting to circle back and lure the German Fleet back to the rest of the British Force. It reminds me of the Battle of Leyte Gulf, again from WWII, where the Japanese deliberately used their remaining carriers as bait to pull Halsey north and then attempt to attack the vacated area with their main fleet. Expensive bait in both cases.
Did the British correct the design flaw before the War ended? Did the Germans realize that this design flaw gave them a considerable advantage? If so, why didn’t they try again to exploit it?

[Historian]

Did the British correct the design flaw before the War ended? Did the Germans realize that this design flaw gave them a considerable advantage? If so, why didn’t they try again to exploit it?

Yes, as well as improving ammunition handling procedures, which had also contributed to the loss of the three RN battlecruisers. The German Navy was not aware of these issues as far as I know. It wasn't really something they could have exploited as naval gunnery at ranges of several thousand yards did not permit fire to be concentrated on particular parts of a target ship. Also, as you pointed out in the OP, the German High Seas Fleet did not care to risk another battle for the rest of the war.