Understanding the Origins of the First World War

[Tevot]

Never too late my friend.

And it's never too late to revive the discussion ? Having finally read Christopher Clark's book on the origins of the war, I'm tempted to ask why he called it Sleepwalkers - especially given the compelling evidence he gives that the French (particularly Poincare and Paleologue) quite consciously egged on the Russians as they committed themselves to supporting Serbia come what may. It proved a fascinating, surprising and shocking read. None of the parties involved are blameless - and Edward Grey (at the centre of a hawkish cabal in the Liberal Government) strikes me as being a dangerously duplicitous and slippery loose cannon. The thing that most depressed me is how the British Government according to Clark committed to war not because of the issue of Belgian sovereignty (indeed the British anticipated and initially seemed relaxed that German war plans would necessitate armies moving through Belgium) - nor even primarily because of the issue prestige and credibility - but because leading Liberals felt that if they opposed intervention this would lead to a split in the Party and them losing power to the Tories who would in all likelihood intervene on behalf of France in a war against Germany. Party Politics and vested interest sealed the fate of hundreds of thousands of British servicemen.

A good if sobering read and it has prompted me to purchase Iron Kingdom - Clark's chronicle of the rise and downfall of Prussia 1600 - 1947.

http://www.amazon.co.uk/Iron-Kingdom-Downfall-Prussia-1600-1947-ebook/dp/B002RI9PMM

Clark can be seen giving a lecture on the Great War origins on youtube and the Gresham College website...

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6snYQFcyiyg

Best Wishes,

Tevot

[aeolium]

None of the parties involved are blameless - and Edward Grey (at the centre of a hawkish cabal in the Liberal Government) strikes me as being a dangerously duplicitous and slippery loose cannon. The thing that most depressed me is how the British Government according to Clark committed to war not because of the issue of Belgian sovereignty (indeed the British anticipated and initially seemed relaxed that German war plans would necessitate armies moving through Belgium) - nor even primarily because of the issue prestige and credibility - but because leading Liberals felt that if they opposed intervention this would lead to a split in the Party and them losing power to the Tories who would in all likelihood intervene on behalf of France in a war against Germany. Party Politics and vested interest sealed the fate of hundreds of thousands of British servicemen.

Clark can be seen giving a lecture on the Great War origins on youtube and the Gresham College website...

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6snYQFcyiyg

I'm not sure it was even as straightforward as that. Even as late as 1 August 1914 there was no majority for intervention in the British cabinet (the French ambassador Paul Cambon was in anguish, believing that Britain had "dropped" its Entente ally). The threat of a party split was there, but this had been there for some time with the division between the pro-interventionists and the anti-interventionists. But the press and public opinion were clearly turning in favour of intervention. And Clark mentions the quandary that Grey and the other leading Liberals including Asquith found themselves in as the prospect of a continental war became more likely: the danger to Britain's maritime security and its imperial interests with the decline of the Ottoman Empire. It was partly to shore up those interests that Britain had entered an alliance with Russia in the first place, to forestall hostile Russian assaults on the British interests in the Middle East and South Asia. That imperialist position was put in a telegram of 25 July by the Liberal Eyre Crowe, quoted by Clark: "Should the war come, and Britain stand aside, one of two things must happen: a) Either Germany and Austria win, crush France and humiliate Russia. What will be the position of a friendless England? [sic] (b) or France and Russia win. What would then be their attitude towards England? What about India and the Mediterranean?"

I enjoyed the Clark lecture. I am now planning to read Margaret MacMillan's book "The War That Ended Peace" for a different perspective.

[Historian]

And it's never too late to revive the discussion ? Having finally read Christopher Clark's book on the origins of the war, I'm tempted to ask why he called it Sleepwalkers -

Maybe because all sides seem to have viewed the war as a solution to the problems surrounding them, without realising the potential consequences?

Glad you enjoyed Clark's book. Haven't read the history of Prussia as I assume that I know about most of it anyway, but I'm sure to be mistaken; will put it on the list.

[Historian]

And Clark mentions the quandary that Grey and the other leading Liberals including Asquith found themselves in as the prospect of a continental war became more likely: the danger to Britain's maritime security and its imperial interests with the decline of the Ottoman Empire. It was partly to shore up those interests that Britain had entered an alliance with Russia in the first place, to forestall hostile Russian assaults on the British interests in the Middle East and South Asia. That imperialist position was put in a telegram of 25 July by the Liberal Eyre Crowe, quoted by Clark: "Should the war come, and Britain stand aside, one of two things must happen: a) Either Germany and Austria win, crush France and humiliate Russia. What will be the position of a friendless England? [sic] (b) or France and Russia win. What would then be their attitude towards England? What about India and the Mediterranean?"

Always worth remembering that Britain viewed foreign policy as an imperial power. As you mention, Russia was again looming large as threat to the British Empire in the Middle East by 1914. Good to be reminded how complex this all was, still the subject of debate and argument. A useful corrective to the simplicities peddled by various politicians who should know better.

I will watch the Clark lecture when I can give it my full attention.

[Tevot]

Hello there,

Thanks for the comments aeolium. You're quite right to say that any number of reasons were at the time and indeed since were given to justify Britain's entry into the war. The interesting one here is the issue of maritime security. In 1914 the Royal Navy was still the largest in the world - and this superiority was recognized in 1912 in a German proposal recognizing the RN's dominance in return for a British commitment to neutrality should Germany be attacked by another power (The Haldane Mission) The British refused this - ostensibly because they didn't wish to be drawn into any European conflict and wanted to preserve the status quo. Oh the irony !! As for Eyre Crowe - again he was part of a small but influential group citing Germany as Britain's key antagonist (The Crowe Memorandum of 1907 sets it all out as well as sounding like a Robert Ludlum novel ) so his comments should be taken with a degree of caution. Dare I suggest that Britain's descent into War resulted from a combined failure of nerve? That of the hawks ( Grey, Haldane, Churchill and to a lesser degree Asquith who frankly didn't keep an eye on things) who let themselves be overtaken by events and to be dragged into the wrong war at the wrong time against the wrong threat ( i.e. Germany instead of Russia) And also that of the Liberal peace party ( Morley & co) who at the very last moment bottled it in the face of whipped up jingoism (indeed to what extent was this popular?) and party political considerations? Interesting stuff...

I too have the Margaret Macmillan book and will be looking at it perhaps in 6 months time Beforehand, I've got to get through The Long Shadow by David Reynolds that I've just started - this deals with the impact and legacy of the Great War ...

Then after that I'd probably need to take a break and read some prose... Any suggestions gratefully received...

Wishing you a good Good Friday,

Best Wishes,

Tevot

[richardfinegold]

I'm not sure it was even as straightforward as that. Even as late as 1 August 1914 there was no majority for intervention in the British cabinet (the French ambassador Paul Cambon was in anguish, believing that Britain had "dropped" its Entente ally). The threat of a party split was there, but this had been there for some time with the division between the pro-interventionists and the anti-interventionists. But the press and public opinion were clearly turning in favour of intervention. And Clark mentions the quandary that Grey and the other leading Liberals including Asquith found themselves in as the prospect of a continental war became more likely: the danger to Britain's maritime security and its imperial interests with the decline of the Ottoman Empire. It was partly to shore up those interests that Britain had entered an alliance with Russia in the first place, to forestall hostile Russian assaults on the British interests in the Middle East and South Asia. That imperialist position was put in a telegram of 25 July by the Liberal Eyre Crowe, quoted by Clark: "Should the war come, and Britain stand aside, one of two things must happen: a) Either Germany and Austria win, crush France and humiliate Russia. What will be the position of a friendless England? [sic] (b) or France and Russia win. What would then be their attitude towards England? What about India and the Mediterranean?"

I enjoyed the Clark lecture. I am now planning to read Margaret MacMillan's book "The War That Ended Peace" for a different perspective.

MacMillian's book does a better job than Clark about reviewing the many crises that preceded Sarajevo in the buildup to the War, and also in discussing the various (and ultimately) ineffective Peace movements, including the failure of International Socialism. The two books together are wonderfully complimentary.
I was stunned by these books to realize the attitude of the French and Russians (and to a lesser extent, the British) re: retribution for the Assassination of the Archduke. They took the attitude that the Austrians had it coming to them, had no legitimate grievance, and were not entitled to any recourse.

[richardfinegold]

Hello there,

Thanks for the comments aeolium. You're quite right to say that any number of reasons were at the time and indeed since were given to justify Britain's entry into the war. The interesting one here is the issue of maritime security. In 1914 the Royal Navy was still the largest in the world - and this superiority was recognized in 1912 in a German proposal recognizing the RN's dominance in return for a British commitment to neutrality should Germany be attacked by another power (The Haldane Mission) The British refused this - ostensibly because they didn't wish to be drawn into any European conflict and wanted to preserve the status quo. Oh the irony !! As for Eyre Crowe - again he was part of a small but influential group citing Germany as Britain's key antagonist (The Crowe Memorandum of 1907 sets it all out as well as sounding like a Robert Ludlum novel ) so his comments should be taken with a degree of caution. Dare I suggest that Britain's descent into War resulted from a combined failure of nerve? That of the hawks ( Grey, Haldane, Churchill and to a lesser degree Asquith who frankly didn't keep an eye on things) who let themselves be overtaken by events and to be dragged into the wrong war at the wrong time against the wrong threat ( i.e. Germany instead of Russia) And also that of the Liberal peace party ( Morley & co) who at the very last moment bottled it in the face of whipped up jingoism (indeed to what extent was this popular?) and party political considerations? Interesting stuff...

I too have the Margaret Macmillan book and will be looking at it perhaps in 6 months time Beforehand, I've got to get through The Long Shadow by David Reynolds that I've just started - this deals with the impact and legacy of the Great War ...

Then after that I'd probably need to take a break and read some prose... Any suggestions gratefully received...

Wishing you a good Good Friday,

Best Wishes,

Tevot

The Brits were committed to the French. They had assumed the responsibility of guaranteeing the safety of the French coastline against the Prussians. The dishonorable part of that was that this was kept secret and was dropped like a bombshell by Grey in his Speech when he asked for the declaration of war. It was a reckless policy for the British to pursue, but if they had not fulfilled their commitment to the French, they would have had no credibility going forward in International Affairs.

[aeolium]

MacMillian's book does a better job than Clark about reviewing the many crises that preceded Sarajevo in the buildup to the War, and also in discussing the various (and ultimately) ineffective Peace movements, including the failure of International Socialism. The two books together are wonderfully complimentary.
I was stunned by these books to realize the attitude of the French and Russians (and to a lesser extent, the British) re: retribution for the Assassination of the Archduke. They took the attitude that the Austrians had it coming to them, had no legitimate grievance, and were not entitled to any recourse.

Partly prompted by your praise for MacMillan's book, rfg, I bought it in the summer and have just finished reading it. It is as you say an excellent work, complementary to Clark's and coming at the pre-War period from a different perspective. For MacMillan, the personalities of the main protagonists - heads of state, politicians, diplomats - are very important, and the operation of chance (e.g. the deaths of key people who might have been keen advocates of peace). There are great vignettes of key characters, including the Kaiser, in the book. Also she pays a lot of attention to the instability of the European order in the years leading up to 1914 - how close Europe was to a major war breaking out in the earlier crises, like Austria-Hungary's annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1908, or the Moroccan crisis in 1911, or the two Balkan wars in 1912. For MacMillan Europe suffered from having weak men in positions of power - the Kaiser, the Tsar, Asquith, Franz Joseph, Berchthold, Bethmann, etc - as well as for the most part having power concentrated in their hands with relatively weak parliamentary accountability. And the sheer casualness, the aristocratic nature of government at that time, with powerful people departing on summer holiday even in the middle of enormous crises, is something that could not have happened post 1945 and contributed to the build-up of almost unstoppable forces driving the leaders towards war in the weeks post-assassination. Asquith for instance wrote to his beloved Venetia Stanley on August 1 1914 to bemoan the fact that the cabinet meeting (to discuss the most serious European situation since the time of Napoleon) would prevent him from seeing her that day!

MacMillan makes regular comparisons of events and political action in that period with events in later or earlier periods: for instance, with the Cuban missile crisis, when Kennedy's decision to ignore the pressure of his military advisers for a hardline response to the Soviet Union might have been influenced in part by the fact that he had been reading Barbara Tuchmann's account of the lead up to the First World War, The Guns of August. She also contrasts the Kaiser's impetuousness and capriciousness in judgement with the surer judgement of Bismarck whose successors in the early C20 were sadly mediocre.

I like the closing lines of this 600-page work: "And if we want to point fingers from the twenty-first century we can accuse those who took Europe into war of two things. First, a failure of imagination in not seeing how destructive such a conflict would be and second, their lack of courage to stand up to those who said there was no choice left but to go to war. There are always choices." That last line in particular is a standing rebuke to historians who think that because history happened as it did it was destined to happen, as well as politicians (including plenty of living ones) who have trotted out the old lie: "There is no alternative."

[Pabmusic]

I came across this series on YouTube:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f11CKYB2FCA

Being a natural sceptic, I tested the waters carefully, but found it very good indeed. The main thread follows WW1 week-by-week.

Well worth a look.

[french frank]

Good to see the resuscitation of this thread. Mgt Mac next (Had I but world enough or time, but I'll do my best.)

£3.81 from Am. Mkt Pl.

[aeolium]

Mgt Mac next (Had I but world enough or time, but I'll do my best.)

Look forward to seeing your review next summer, ff

[french frank]

Look forward to seeing your review next summer, ff

As in, 'Not this coming summer, but the next one after that'? I'm afraid the Christopher Clark has not been consumed to the (bitter) end, and the most recent order, anticipated with great joy, hasn't even been started:

[Historian]

So many books, so little time. Or, better phrased: "of making many books there is no end". Although I am not sure that I entirely agree with how that continues: "and much study is a weariness of the flesh."

[richardfinegold]

Partly prompted by your praise for MacMillan's book, rfg, I bought it in the summer and have just finished reading it. It is as you say an excellent work, complementary to Clark's and coming at the pre-War period from a different perspective. For MacMillan, the personalities of the main protagonists - heads of state, politicians, diplomats - are very important, and the operation of chance (e.g. the deaths of key people who might have been keen advocates of peace). There are great vignettes of key characters, including the Kaiser, in the book. Also she pays a lot of attention to the instability of the European order in the years leading up to 1914 - how close Europe was to a major war breaking out in the earlier crises, like Austria-Hungary's annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1908, or the Moroccan crisis in 1911, or the two Balkan wars in 1912. For MacMillan Europe suffered from having weak men in positions of power - the Kaiser, the Tsar, Asquith, Franz Joseph, Berchthold, Bethmann, etc - as well as for the most part having power concentrated in their hands with relatively weak parliamentary accountability. And the sheer casualness, the aristocratic nature of government at that time, with powerful people departing on summer holiday even in the middle of enormous crises, is something that could not have happened post 1945 and contributed to the build-up of almost unstoppable forces driving the leaders towards war in the weeks post-assassination. Asquith for instance wrote to his beloved Venetia Stanley on August 1 1914 to bemoan the fact that the cabinet meeting (to discuss the most serious European situation since the time of Napoleon) would prevent him from seeing her that day!

MacMillan makes regular comparisons of events and political action in that period with events in later or earlier periods: for instance, with the Cuban missile crisis, when Kennedy's decision to ignore the pressure of his military advisers for a hardline response to the Soviet Union might have been influenced in part by the fact that he had been reading Barbara Tuchmann's account of the lead up to the First World War, The Guns of August. She also contrasts the Kaiser's impetuousness and capriciousness in judgement with the surer judgement of Bismarck whose successors in the early C20 were sadly mediocre.

I like the closing lines of this 600-page work: "And if we want to point fingers from the twenty-first century we can accuse those who took Europe into war of two things. First, a failure of imagination in not seeing how destructive such a conflict would be and second, their lack of courage to stand up to those who said there was no choice left but to go to war. There are always choices." That last line in particular is a standing rebuke to historians who think that because history happened as it did it was destined to happen, as well as politicians (including plenty of living ones) who have trotted out the old lie: "There is no alternative."

Another book that you might find interesting--I can't remember if I touted it earlier up thread--is Robert K. Massie "Dreadnoughts". It is very long--over 1000 pages--but has vignettes of all the key players and statesman. MacMillan treads a lot of the same ground with greater concision, and also spends more time, I think dwelling on the importance of the Socialists and the Pacifists, but the sheer volume of detail in Massie and his breezy style make it a worthy supplement.
Immersing myself in the causes of the Great War over the past couple of years makes one so aware of what a horrible tragedy this conflict was. So many different players with so many different agendas all thinking that a War would solve their problems, and sacrificing tens of millions in the process. And the world repeats it's mistakes and seems to learn nothing.