Ukraine

[Dave2002]

This seems very convincing to me. I would add that Ukraine is also destroying Russia's ability to continue to fight by destroying artillery, armoured vehicles etc. as well as trained soldiers in great numbers.

The Ukrainians appear to have destroyed some airbases quite effectively recently, presumably to limit the Russian's ability to launch air borne missiles, and push them to the extremities of the disputed territories.

[JasonPalmer]

As time progresses ukraine will become stronger and russia weaker.

[Frances_iom]

Is the bridge to Crimea still usable? - the Americans are reported as having delivered some longer range missiles so possibly there may be some progress but at present it does seem like a war of attrition at a cost in lives approaching WW1 levels - the rebuilding of Ukraine will require significant money and time but the infrastructure to handle it will not be there.

[Dave2002]

Is the bridge to Crimea still usable? - the Americans are reported as having delivered some longer range missiles so possibly there may be some progress but at present it does seem like a war of attrition at a cost in lives approaching WW1 levels - the rebuilding of Ukraine will require significant money and time but the infrastructure to handle it will not be there.

The bridge is still usable - though has been damaged on several occasions. Probably it is out of range of the current stock of long range missiles if they are to operate from within the areas under Ukrainian control.

[Historian]

Interesting . The impression one gets from the papers is that the Ukraine army is having trouble breaching well prepared Russia defences and that Putin is holding on for a Trump re-election and a decline in US support . I’ve been struggling to find a single broadsheet Pundit predicting significant Ukrainian gains. You seem much more positive . In these wars of attrition sudden collapse is always a distinct possibility. Russian infantry morale must be very low - after a while seeing your mates getting killed in a country you don’t get care much about gets to you.

Apologies again for the late reply: you are quite correct that the papers are cautious regarding any large-scale Ukrainian success. I agree with the view that Putin hopes for a return of Trump with a consequent decline (at best, more likely an ending) of support from the USA. However, although Russian morale is unlikely to be high they have historically been able to keep going despite huge casualties and therefore I don't think a collapse of the front-line troops is likely at the moment.

Why, then, am I so much more optimistic about eventual Ukrainian advances? It's mainly because I judge success in terms of the attrition of Russia's armed forces rather than red lines moving forward on a map. While a degree of caution needs to be exercised about estimates of Russian losses (and Ukraine is very careful not to reveal its own losses in anything but the most general terms) there is a lot of hard evidence about the material lost by Russia, especially in recent months. Initial focus was on tanks, in which Russia had a huge quantitative advantage, but suffered very heavy losses from anti-tank guided missiles, mines and increasingly from drones. Russia has increasingly had to deploy older and older tanks, including the T-55 which was designed shortly after the Second World War. The most modern Russian tank type in general use, the T-90, is regularly shown being destroyed. The T-14 Armata, which was supposed to be a next generation tank superior to all previous Russian models, has never overcome its technical problems and despite Russian claims has not been deployed in Ukraine. The same process can be seen in other armoured fighting vehicles, with the BMP-3 seen in ever-diminishing numbers while many BMP-1s (developed in the 1950s) are being taken out of storage and deployed despite their limited armour. Russia's armoured fighting vehicle production is unable to come close to replacing these losses. Thus, Russia's vaunted armoured forces have been taken to pieces. Furthermore, although they are still able to deploy tanks and armoured fighting vehicles in large numbers, recent heavy losses at Avdiivka show that Russia has not learned from its previous defeats.

However, even more important is the continued destruction of the Russian artillery arm, both trained men and guns. The majority of modern Russian artillery has now been destroyed, leading to an increased reliance on older artillery pieces, many of them towed by vehicles rather than self-propelled. These guns have a lower calibre (the size of shell fired), shorter range and are more vulnerable to counter-battery fire because they take longer to deploy. It is the artillery cover which has made the Russian defences so formidable: when that is reduced to a negligible amount then it is a question of time before the Russian lines are broken.

Ukraine is doing its best to take the enemy apart while keeping its own losses as small as possible. This will inevitably be a slow process, but is a much more intelligent approach than that seen from the Russians throughout the war. Hence my optimism. I hope that is is justified.

[Ein Heldenleben]

Apologies again for the late reply: you are quite correct that the papers are cautious regarding any large-scale Ukrainian success. I agree with the view that Putin hopes for a return of Trump with a consequent decline (at best, more likely an ending) of support from the USA. However, although Russian morale is unlikely to be high they have historically been able to keep going despite huge casualties and therefore I don't think a collapse of the front-line troops is likely at the moment.

Why, then, am I so much more optimistic about eventual Ukrainian advances? It's mainly because I judge success in terms of the attrition of Russia's armed forces rather than red lines moving forward on a map. While a degree of caution needs to be exercised about estimates of Russian losses (and Ukraine is very careful not to reveal its own losses in anything but the most general terms) there is a lot of hard evidence about the material lost by Russia, especially in recent months. Initial focus was on tanks, in which Russia had a huge quantitative advantage, but suffered very heavy losses from anti-tank guided missiles, mines and increasingly from drones. Russia has increasingly had to deploy older and older tanks, including the T-55 which was designed shortly after the Second World War. The most modern Russian tank type in general use, the T-90, is regularly shown being destroyed. The T-14 Armata, which was supposed to be a next generation tank superior to all previous Russian models, has never overcome its technical problems and despite Russian claims has not been deployed in Ukraine. The same process can be seen in other armoured fighting vehicles, with the BMP-3 seen in ever-diminishing numbers while many BMP-1s (developed in the 1950s) are being taken out of storage and deployed despite their limited armour. Russia's armoured fighting vehicle production is unable to come close to replacing these losses. Thus, Russia's vaunted armoured forces have been taken to pieces. Furthermore, although they are still able to deploy tanks and armoured fighting vehicles in large numbers, recent heavy losses at Avdiivka show that Russia has not learned from its previous defeats.

However, even more important is the continued destruction of the Russian artillery arm, both trained men and guns. The majority of modern Russian artillery has now been destroyed, leading to an increased reliance on older artillery pieces, many of them towed by vehicles rather than self-propelled. These guns have a lower calibre (the size of shell fired), shorter range and are more vulnerable to counter-battery fire because they take longer to deploy. It is the artillery cover which has made the Russian defences so formidable: when that is reduced to a negligible amount then it is a question of time before the Russian lines are broken.

Ukraine is doing its best to take the enemy apart while keeping its own losses as small as possible. This will inevitably be a slow process, but is a much more intelligent approach than that seen from the Russians throughout the war. Hence my optimism. I hope that is is justified.

I had no idea their artillery had been so degraded. If they are reliant on towed how many rounds can they fire before attracting accurate counter fire ? Two or three ? You’ve got to be extraordinarily accurate in your first salvo or it’s curtains . I don’t envy their gunners . I reckon they’ll fire a round and then scram ..which is hopeless.

[Historian]

I had no idea their artillery had been so degraded. If they are reliant on towed how many rounds can they fire before attracting accurate counter fire ? Two or three ? You’ve got to be extraordinarily accurate in your first salvo or it’s curtains . I don’t envy their gunners . I reckon they’ll fire a round and then scram ..which is hopeless.

That sums up their problems very succinctly. Ukraine's counter-battery fire is better organised and directed than Russia's. I decided that my post was long enough however, as you are clearly well-informed on this, I would add that there are reports from Russian sources of variations in the weight of shells being supplied which would make very accurate firing effectively impossible. Russia's artillery superiority, which they have relied on both historically and in Ukraine, is now a thing of the past.

[Ein Heldenleben]

That sums up their problems very succinctly. Ukraine's counter-battery fire is better organised and directed than Russia's. I decided that my post was long enough however, as you are clearly well-informed on this, I would add that there are reports from Russian sources of variations in the weight of shells being supplied which would make very accurate firing effectively impossible. Russia's artillery superiority, which they have relied on both historically and in Ukraine, is now a thing of the past.

Presumably the Ukrainians have access to NATO counter battery radar (accurate to 3 -4 meters on a 1km trajectory according to wiki) whereas the Russians’ is presumably nowhere near as good. Also counter counter measures I,e, radar detection and destruction is likely to be way better. And indeed counter -counter - counter (?) - blanking Soviet detection of Ukranian CBR. It’s all these seemingly small tech advantages that count.
I hope for the sake of those hapless gunners that at least the shell diameter is right.

[Historian]

The Ukrainians appear to have destroyed some airbases quite effectively recently, presumably to limit the Russian's ability to launch air borne missiles, and push them to the extremities of the disputed territories.

The recent successful attacks on air-bases at Berdyansk and Luhansk were aimed at helicopters which were being used on the front line. This first use of the newly-arrived ATACMS missiles were very successful and seem to have reduced Russian air attacks on support of their ground troops. However, this will not have any effect on long-range missile attacks as these are carried out by aircraft (and from ships) well behind the front lines. Ukraine has has some success with attacking such bombers by using long-range drones. Ultimately Ukraine still depends on the effectiveness of its strengthened air defences.

[french frank]

New article about deserting Russian soldiers:

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/oct/26/russian-deserters-call-on-former-comrades-to-join-them-armenia-soldiers-ukraine-war

[Serial_Apologist]

Freedman [sic] is fine when he comes to weighing up tactical and strategic success vs failure on each side; the trouble is he doesn't examine Israeli motives behind its treatment of Palestinans, now or forever, other than from the pov of how they might be received by supporters abroad.

[Dave2002]

Numerically - if we keep a score tally, the Ukraine situation is still serious. Reducing conflicts to score cards is a sad way to evaluate crisis moments - such as Israel-Palestine flare ups, Russia-Ukraine, or even just natural disasters like earthquakes or disease outbreaks.

[Eine Alpensinfonie]

This thread is now being reinstated. Discussion here was almost always more than reasonable, even when opinions differed. Please would posters help to ensure that their contributions do nothing to cast into doubt the continuity of this thread/topic.
Please do not use this, or any other thread, to refer to those that have been closed.

[Frances_iom]

An appropriate message heralds the re-opening - a stark reminder of why this war is key to Europe's future - the avoidance of autocracy and imperialist control. The situation elsewhere has removed the spotlight - the EU has started Ukraine on its membership path but I doubt it will be in any position to truly join in this decade if not much later. Trumpism apparently rules in the key swing states that by the highly skewed Electoral College can present the Presidency to one who gets a minority of the popular vote - Trump supporters have already blocked significant funds to Ukraine whereas Putin has it seems forged a supply arrangement for munitions with North Korea in exchange for cheap oil + food - the only problem it seems being the restricted communications via rail. Russia, continues to use the same approach as it did in Syria - destroy totally the civilian infrastructure (with of course total disregard to casualties) then sheer weight of troop numbers will suffice. Whether smart western weapons can help here especially as these always follow months after the problems they might prevent have appeared.

[french frank]

the EU has started Ukraine on its membership path but I doubt it will be in any position to truly join in this decade if not much later.

Did I read something about the parts of independent/unoccupied Ukraine being allowed to join - just to begin with? I'm not sure that that seems like an idea free from likely problems on all sides.