Originally posted by Historian
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well it seems he has not got the necessary permission to acquire them - the best estimates I've heard are some 4 months of training at least for the most experienced pilots - I wonder if some has already been given 'under the radar' - but all commentators point to the difficulty of setting up the necessary support infrastructure. If these are to believed the long awaited spring offensive looks to be more a late summer one - though the advent of a few F-16s might be able to stop the use of the glide bombs fired from over the Caspian Sea. -
I can see what you mean but I think it's unlikely. He's not saying anything that isn't already in the public arena. The Russians may well be trying to up their game (although their success has been very limited) but not because of what Western analysts are saying.Originally posted by Serial_Apologist View Post
Michael Clarke is very knowledgeable and clear (another ex King's London professor, as well as Royal United Services Institute). It was good to hear someone being allowed to explain something at length. Perhaps this is what some podcasts do. Thank you 8thO for the link and apologies for the slow response.Comment
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Will he, won't he this time?
'Ready to return' if the Russian army isn't coping? After what he's been saying about the Russian army? Kyiv is cautious anyway.
It isn't given us to know those rare moments when people are wide open and the lightest touch can wither or heal. A moment too late and we can never reach them any more in this world.Comment
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Interesting article from Dr Jade McGlynn on today's drone attacks in Moscow.
Coincidentally(!), Dr McGlynn has a new book published tomorrow which looks right up my street and might be of interest to anyone following this thread.
"The sound is the handwriting of the conductor" - Bernard HaitinkComment
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Thank you for these links, very interesting.Originally posted by Petrushka View PostInteresting article from Dr Jade McGlynn on today's drone attacks in Moscow.
Coincidentally(!), Dr McGlynn has a new book published tomorrow which looks right up my street and might be of interest to anyone following this thread.
https://www.amazon.co.uk/Memory-Make...ps%2C98&sr=8-1
Although it would be very hard to prove that the most recent drone attack on Moscow was a 'false flag' attempt to pin the blame elsewhere, Putin and Russia have form in this area. Other possibilities are anti-Putin elements in Russia or an actual Ukrainian operation. Not sure whether this would have the effects Ukraine might have wanted, as it may affect international support adversely to be seen attacking civilian areas of Moscow albeit in quite a small way. If, on the other hand, the aim was to target the top echelons of Moscow society in a relatively restricted manner (as mentioned in the article above) then it might have disproportionate effects.
The distortion of History in Russia is closely linked to the regime's narrative of Russia being under a permanent (and growing) external threat which justifies any and all measures Putin takes both within and outside Russia. Many Russians seem to have been happy enough to go along with this especially in the increasingly enforced absence of alternative points of view. The rehabilitation of Stalin is not a happy precedent for Russia's emergence as a liberal democracy. Dr. McGlynn's book does look interesting but where to find the time?Comment
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The latest contribution from Sir Lawrence which has just pinged into my inbox:
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The argument about using salami tactics is good, except small incremental aggressive steps are more easily dealt with, and by the Ukrainians who are carrying the burden for the rest of us, than an all-in assault or invasion, one would think.Originally posted by HighlandDougie View PostComment
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I didn't quite get the salami slicing vs boiled frog distinction, but as usual an insightful article. he seems to suggest that the limited Ukranian attacks inside Russia have had a great psychological value. It is always difficult to stop making comparisons between Putin's Russia of today and the totalitarian regimes of World War II, but to go back to that well, the Allies hoped that the bombings of Germany and Japan would deligitimaize those regimes in the eyes of their people, and would lead to revolutions. No such thing happened (notwithstanding the Stauffenburg plot in Germany, which even if it had succeeded in killing Hitler probably would not have had enough support to lead to a Revolution). However, Putin's Russia is more like Fascist Italy, in that it is a less successful at inspiring it's people to the vision of the elites, and unable to completely clamp down on the flow of information within the country. This allowed a rebellion to coalesce around the Monarchy. I don't see a similar nexus of alternative power in Russia.Comment
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Not a distinction but two ways of trying to describe the same thing, except, as he points out, the frog analogy is based on an urban myth. Frogs do not wait around to be boiled. Being poikilotherms, they make use of the heating water to up their metabolic rate, then jump out, once they are 'charged up'.Originally posted by richardfinegold View PostComment
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And so which side Military was supposed to be the boiled frog, and why? Usually I find his writing very illuminating, but the gastronomic analogy eluded me here.Originally posted by Bryn View PostComment
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I think his argument moved from a general point about 'salami tactics' being difficult to combat to the more specific scenario with Russia as the frog in question. However, Prof. Freedman then admitted that the Russians, unlike the frog, are aware that Ukraine is being given more effective weapons and equipment in small steps (turning up the temperature if you will). Putin's problem is that he does not know what to do about the salami slicing.Originally posted by richardfinegold View Post
In other words, having introduced the frog metaphor the Professor admitted it wasn't the most apt. Hope that helps.Comment
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I have waited a few days to be sure, but it now seems clear that Ukraine's summer offensive has begun.
This will not be an overwhelming attack in one area in the way of El Alamein 1942 or Kursk (1943). Rather the Ukrainians are attacking on multiple axes with the aim of unbalancing the Russian defenders, drawing in their reserves and revealing previously concealed units and supplies. For weeks Russian supply lines and headquarters have been under sustained bombardment in the same way that Ukraine 'prepared the battlefield' before re-taking the city of Kherson. Areas of weakness will be exploited, stronger areas of defence will remain under pressure to distract the Russians from the key lines of attack. It is quite possible that heavy fighting will continue for months and that the eventual Ukrainian breakthroughs will occur in areas not currently seeing much in the way of open conflict.
Despite considerable military aid given in the form of more modern tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, artillery etc. I believe that this will be a difficult and costly operation. Russia has has considerable time to create defences in depth. Despite heavy (and increasing) losses in artillery the Russians will undoubtedly inflict heavy casualties while Ukraine breaks through Russian minefields and trench systems. However, the previous Russian losses in experienced personnel and equipment will make defending such a long front line increasingly difficult.
At present news from the Ukrainian side is restricted by 'operational security' so much of what is appearing on the internet is from Russian or pro-Russian sources. Understandable this will mostly give a very negative view of the progress of Ukraine's offensive designed to reduce rhe resolve of Ukraine's supporters. Losses and setbacks are inevitable in war (indeed some have already happened with regard to this new offensive, without mentioning the appalling devastation caused by the destruction of the Kakhovka dam) but I would everyone interested not to read too much into what happens in the initial stages of what will be a long and complicated operation.
For a view from someone with rather more direct military experience than me, I would recommend reading this Twitter thread from retired Australian general Mick Ryan.Comment
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Thanks for the link. As you say, well worth reading.Comment
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....I don't know if this has been covered up ward in thread - what is the situation reported as regards Nato donated weapons turning up in Russia/ being sold on/news items fake news....bong chingComment
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It was mentioned a very long time ago (I think well over a year).Originally posted by eighthobstruction View Post
I would imagine that the only NATO weapons turning up in Russia now would be those (I believe very few) captured on the battlefield. It would hardly be in Ukraine's own interests to lose control of weapons and equipment which they desperately need for what is effectively a life or death struggle. The same would be true of selling weapons on to a 'third party'. This would risk reducing the supply of arms from NATO (and other friendly) countries on which Ukraine increasingly depends. Ukraine did not have a good reputation as regards corruption for much of its existence as an independent country (although Russia is something of a world-leader in that respect). This was one of the reasons why Zelensky was elected as a political 'unknown'. Efforts have been made to improve things but there is some debate as to how far these have been successful, especially once Russia invaded.
The western powers will no doubt have demanded what guarantees can be given regarding what has been sent to Ukraine. This situation will still be relevant when (if?) Russia has been defeated as Ukraine will want to be, at the very least, good friends with NATO.
Unlike Ukraine Russia has no real need of NATO weapons and equipment as they would not be usable alongside their own being incompatible in terms of ammunition/ maintenance requirements etc.Comment
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