Ukraine

[HighlandDougie]

As ever thoughtful, the latest post from Sir Lawrence Freedman:

https://samf.substack.com/p/makiiva-and-bakhmut-the-impact-of?utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email

[JasonPalmer]

As ever thoughtful, the latest post from Sir Lawrence Freedman:

https://samf.substack.com/p/makiiva-...m_medium=email

Very interesting, thanks for sharing.

[Bella Kemp]

Perhaps the biggest mistake from Mr Putin was to appear in a video link with President Xi, calling him a dear friend and suggesting that they might create a new world order. Following this, the more cautious of European leaders such as M. Macron and Herr Schultz committed to extra support for Ukraine. Mr Putin must surely be experiencing a sense of doom.

[richardfinegold]

As ever thoughtful, the latest post from Sir Lawrence Freedman:

https://samf.substack.com/p/makiiva-...m_medium=email

The most interesting to me was that Putin seems stuck in forever mounting small scale assault s which are doomed to failure. Russians only have relative success with overwhelming indiscriminate artillery barrages. At some point Putin may decide to replace that with tactical Nuclear Strikes

[Frances_iom]

... At some point Putin may decide to replace that with tactical Nuclear Strikes

That would prove decisive for the West and be the ultimate test of its resolve tho it depends very much on what target and what yield he uses - taking out a major city with deaths in the 10s of thousands will I suspect be treated very differently than nuking a small town occupied only by pensioners and troops but if the West does not retaliate with something greater than the sanctions which don't really stop the war effort, then given the Russian nuclear arsenal and a now demonstrated commitment to its use, then Putin will have won - maybe a retaliatory nuke on Kalingrad might halt development

[Historian]

As ever thoughtful, the latest post from Sir Lawrence Freedman:

https://samf.substack.com/p/makiiva-...m_medium=email

Thank you: had missed this one. For the sake of (relative ) completeness here is the previous entry in which he reviews the accuracy - or otherwise - of his earlier commentaries. Might be useful for someone who does not wish to go back to February/March of last year.

[Historian]

Perhaps the biggest mistake from Mr Putin was to appear in a video link with President Xi, calling him a dear friend and suggesting that they might create a new world order. Following this, the more cautious of European leaders such as M. Macron and Herr Schultz committed to extra support for Ukraine. Mr Putin must surely be experiencing a sense of doom.

I believe that Macron has decided that his earlier support of an 'off ramp' for Putin was, shall we say, unwise: France has given Ukraine considerable help for some time. So, to a lesser extent, has Germany. However Scholz is still very unwilling to give Ukraine more help than he absolutely has to. His coalition allies, notably the Green Party Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock, have had to drive him into backing up his public statements in favour of Ukraine. Slowly but surely Scholz (and the SDP) are being pushed into a decision to send Ukraine Leopard II Main Battle Tanks (MBTs) which is one of the main weapons they will need to continue driving Russia out of Ukraine.

[Historian]

Sorry for a third post in succession.

The main strength of Putin's threat of using nuclear weapons is that he never actually has to follow through with it. It achieves his aim of frightening the West and pushing back the time when the US and the rest of NATO will increase their military support of Ukraine to the next level. So, it only works for Putin as long as he doesn't 'press the button'.

However, it has been used so many times and has begun to look increasingly threadbare. One isolated nuclear attack, though a truly terrible escalation, would not turn the tide of the war in his favour.

If he did decide to use a battlefield (or tactical) nuclear weapon then it is pretty well certain (I do not have access to the higher councils of NATO) that he would speedily see most of his conventional forces (not just those in Ukraine) destroyed by NATO using conventional weapons. Putin will have been warned about this and the performance of his forces so far will give him little confidence that Russian air defence would be much use in protecting, for example, the Black Sea Fleet (even if it is no longer in Sevastopol) or his strategic bomber force.

There is absolutely no chance that NATO would destroy a Russian city (surrounded by NATO countries) in retaliation for the use of a battlefield nuclear weapon.

[richardfinegold]

Sorry for a third post in succession.

The main strength of Putin's threat of using nuclear weapons is that he never actually has to follow through with it. It achieves his aim of frightening the West and pushing back the time when the US and the rest of NATO will increase their military support of Ukraine to the next level. So, it only works for Putin as long as he doesn't 'press the button'.

However, it has been used so many times and has begun to look increasingly threadbare. One isolated nuclear attack, though a truly terrible escalation, would not turn the tide of the war in his favour.

If he did decide to use a battlefield (or tactical) nuclear weapon then it is pretty well certain (I do not have access to the higher councils of NATO) that he would speedily see most of his conventional forces (not just those in Ukraine) destroyed by NATO using conventional weapons. Putin will have been warned about this and the performance of his forces so far will give him little confidence that Russian air defence would be much use in protecting, for example, the Black Sea Fleet (even if it is no longer in Sevastopol) or his strategic bomber force.

There is absolutely no chance that NATO would destroy a Russian city (surrounded by NATO countries) in retaliation for the use of a battlefield nuclear weapon.

This is assuming that Putin makes rational calculations. As the defeats mount, so will his capacity for irrational ones

[french frank]

This is assuming that Putin makes rational calculations. As the defeats mount, so will his capacity for irrational ones

Do the Russians have an equivalent of the 25th amendment (probably not)? Or some formal authority which requires something more than the presidential order?

[Historian]

This is assuming that Putin makes rational calculations. As the defeats mount, so will his capacity for irrational ones

Yes, this is very true. However, there is a chain of command (i.e. who actually passes on the orders/carries them out)and I'm not sure they want to destroy themselves, their families and everything else. Let us hope not.

[Historian]

As has become customary, here is Professor Lawrence Freedman's latest post on Ukraine. He covers the debate over Chancellor Scholz's continued resistance to allowing Leopard 2 tanks, currently held by other countries, to be sent to Ukraine, as well as how far the conflict in Ukraine is a proxy war.

[richardfinegold]

As has become customary, here is Professor Lawrence Freedman's latest post on Ukraine. He covers the debate over Chancellor Scholz's continued resistance to allowing Leopard 2 tanks, currently held by other countries, to be sent to Ukraine, as well as how far the conflict in Ukraine is a proxy war.

The one year anniversary of the start is coming. This winter will test the resolve of the Ukrainian people as they have no electricity.
I was reading the current issue of Gramophone which contains an add for a Piano competition named for Horowitz and is scheduled to take place in Kyiv. Wouldn’t it be great if it is able to occur and if the world attends in droves as a way to thumb their nose at Putin?

[Bryn]

The one year anniversary of the start is coming. This winter will test the resolve of the Ukrainian people as they have no electricity.
I was reading the current issue of Gramophone which contains an add for a Piano competition named for Horowitz and is scheduled to take place in Kyiv. Wouldn’t it be great if it is able to occur and if the world attends in droves as a way to thumb their nose at Putin?

And if an exiled Russian opponent of the war was to win, that would really be the icing on the cake.

[Historian]

For all that the war in Ukraine may currently seem to be a case of Im Westen nichts Neues, there is a great deal going on.

Rfg mentions that Ukraine is still dealing with regular attacks on its civilian population and infrastructure, such as the terrible destruction of much of an apartment block recently, which is believed to have killed around 50 people. The apartment block was not, by any definition, a military target. It's destruction was more evidence that Russia is running out of effective long-range guided missiles but not, sadly, of ways to kill innocent people.

However, any attempt to damage Ukrainian morale by such means is doomed to failure as a study of previous attempts of this kind in the last one hundred or so years would easily show. Indeed, Russia has almost certainly prejudiced its own interests by an attack of this kind just before them most recent meeting of NATO countries.

Chancellor Scholz is still, it seems, determined to avoid showing leadership by refusing to agree to other countries sending Leopard Two tanks - which the have previously bought from Germany - to Ukraine. This is despite heavy pressure from his coalition partners in the FDP and the Greens. Despite the decision to begin training Ukrainian personnel to work on this kind of tanks, his decision will inevitably delay the hoped-for large-scale Ukrainian counter-attack.

EDIT: As I was writing this, the German foreign minister, Annalena Baerbock, declared that Germany would not stand in the way of Poland wanted to send Leopard tanks to Ukraine. So, I may have been unduly pessimistic.

However, there is some good news with Ukraine now being promised a variety of other very effective weapons including a - mainly symbolic - squadron of Challenger Two tanks for the United Kingdom, the AMX 10 wheeled light tank from France, a large number of Bradley infantry fighting vehicles from the USA and similar equipment from other (mostly European) nations and the USA (which throughout has been the main supplier of military aid and the key support for Ukraine). There are also plans to start training Ukrainian Air Force pilots on the America F16 fighter which would be a major step forward for the war for air supremacy.

Meanwhile Russia continues its incredibly costly offensive around Bakhmut which has allowed it to claim one recent 'victory' - the capture of Soledar (or what's left of it) and several other villages in the area. However, this offensive has cost them tens of thousands of lives for no real strategic gain. Russia has been on the defensive almost everywhere else, with the exception of a brief attempted offensive in recent days in Zaporizhzhia which resulted in minimal gains for heavy losses in personnel and equipment. Many Russian attacks are by infantry along more or less unsupported by tanks or other armoured vehicles. They are using up many of their mobilised men from last year very rapidly.

Ukraine continues to hold on doggedly around Bakhmut. Casualties will be heavy, however far less so than those inflicted on the Russian forces. Keeping the focus of Russian attacks on Bakhmut also serves to weaken their effectiveness elsewhere. The winter has been less severe than usual in the East of Ukraine, which has not helped Ukraine's attacks around Kreminna and towards Svatove. However sketchily-trained and ill-supplied the Russian mobilised troops are, they have been deployed in such numbers that progress has been slow. Furthermore, it is not in Ukraine's interests to attack heedless of casualties. However, they are gradually pushing back the Russians around Kreminna and getting closer to the crucial communications hub of Svatove. While it is unlikely that the next few weeks will see the sort of major advance which happened in the autumn, Russia's position in this part of the theatre is slowly worsening.