Ukraine

[Historian]

I had no idea their artillery had been so degraded. If they are reliant on towed how many rounds can they fire before attracting accurate counter fire ? Two or three ? You’ve got to be extraordinarily accurate in your first salvo or it’s curtains . I don’t envy their gunners . I reckon they’ll fire a round and then scram ..which is hopeless.

That sums up their problems very succinctly. Ukraine's counter-battery fire is better organised and directed than Russia's. I decided that my post was long enough however, as you are clearly well-informed on this, I would add that there are reports from Russian sources of variations in the weight of shells being supplied which would make very accurate firing effectively impossible. Russia's artillery superiority, which they have relied on both historically and in Ukraine, is now a thing of the past.

[Ein Heldenleben]

Apologies again for the late reply: you are quite correct that the papers are cautious regarding any large-scale Ukrainian success. I agree with the view that Putin hopes for a return of Trump with a consequent decline (at best, more likely an ending) of support from the USA. However, although Russian morale is unlikely to be high they have historically been able to keep going despite huge casualties and therefore I don't think a collapse of the front-line troops is likely at the moment.

Why, then, am I so much more optimistic about eventual Ukrainian advances? It's mainly because I judge success in terms of the attrition of Russia's armed forces rather than red lines moving forward on a map. While a degree of caution needs to be exercised about estimates of Russian losses (and Ukraine is very careful not to reveal its own losses in anything but the most general terms) there is a lot of hard evidence about the material lost by Russia, especially in recent months. Initial focus was on tanks, in which Russia had a huge quantitative advantage, but suffered very heavy losses from anti-tank guided missiles, mines and increasingly from drones. Russia has increasingly had to deploy older and older tanks, including the T-55 which was designed shortly after the Second World War. The most modern Russian tank type in general use, the T-90, is regularly shown being destroyed. The T-14 Armata, which was supposed to be a next generation tank superior to all previous Russian models, has never overcome its technical problems and despite Russian claims has not been deployed in Ukraine. The same process can be seen in other armoured fighting vehicles, with the BMP-3 seen in ever-diminishing numbers while many BMP-1s (developed in the 1950s) are being taken out of storage and deployed despite their limited armour. Russia's armoured fighting vehicle production is unable to come close to replacing these losses. Thus, Russia's vaunted armoured forces have been taken to pieces. Furthermore, although they are still able to deploy tanks and armoured fighting vehicles in large numbers, recent heavy losses at Avdiivka show that Russia has not learned from its previous defeats.

However, even more important is the continued destruction of the Russian artillery arm, both trained men and guns. The majority of modern Russian artillery has now been destroyed, leading to an increased reliance on older artillery pieces, many of them towed by vehicles rather than self-propelled. These guns have a lower calibre (the size of shell fired), shorter range and are more vulnerable to counter-battery fire because they take longer to deploy. It is the artillery cover which has made the Russian defences so formidable: when that is reduced to a negligible amount then it is a question of time before the Russian lines are broken.

Ukraine is doing its best to take the enemy apart while keeping its own losses as small as possible. This will inevitably be a slow process, but is a much more intelligent approach than that seen from the Russians throughout the war. Hence my optimism. I hope that is is justified.

I had no idea their artillery had been so degraded. If they are reliant on towed how many rounds can they fire before attracting accurate counter fire ? Two or three ? You’ve got to be extraordinarily accurate in your first salvo or it’s curtains . I don’t envy their gunners . I reckon they’ll fire a round and then scram ..which is hopeless.

[Historian]

Interesting . The impression one gets from the papers is that the Ukraine army is having trouble breaching well prepared Russia defences and that Putin is holding on for a Trump re-election and a decline in US support . I’ve been struggling to find a single broadsheet Pundit predicting significant Ukrainian gains. You seem much more positive . In these wars of attrition sudden collapse is always a distinct possibility. Russian infantry morale must be very low - after a while seeing your mates getting killed in a country you don’t get care much about gets to you.

Apologies again for the late reply: you are quite correct that the papers are cautious regarding any large-scale Ukrainian success. I agree with the view that Putin hopes for a return of Trump with a consequent decline (at best, more likely an ending) of support from the USA. However, although Russian morale is unlikely to be high they have historically been able to keep going despite huge casualties and therefore I don't think a collapse of the front-line troops is likely at the moment.

Why, then, am I so much more optimistic about eventual Ukrainian advances? It's mainly because I judge success in terms of the attrition of Russia's armed forces rather than red lines moving forward on a map. While a degree of caution needs to be exercised about estimates of Russian losses (and Ukraine is very careful not to reveal its own losses in anything but the most general terms) there is a lot of hard evidence about the material lost by Russia, especially in recent months. Initial focus was on tanks, in which Russia had a huge quantitative advantage, but suffered very heavy losses from anti-tank guided missiles, mines and increasingly from drones. Russia has increasingly had to deploy older and older tanks, including the T-55 which was designed shortly after the Second World War. The most modern Russian tank type in general use, the T-90, is regularly shown being destroyed. The T-14 Armata, which was supposed to be a next generation tank superior to all previous Russian models, has never overcome its technical problems and despite Russian claims has not been deployed in Ukraine. The same process can be seen in other armoured fighting vehicles, with the BMP-3 seen in ever-diminishing numbers while many BMP-1s (developed in the 1950s) are being taken out of storage and deployed despite their limited armour. Russia's armoured fighting vehicle production is unable to come close to replacing these losses. Thus, Russia's vaunted armoured forces have been taken to pieces. Furthermore, although they are still able to deploy tanks and armoured fighting vehicles in large numbers, recent heavy losses at Avdiivka show that Russia has not learned from its previous defeats.

However, even more important is the continued destruction of the Russian artillery arm, both trained men and guns. The majority of modern Russian artillery has now been destroyed, leading to an increased reliance on older artillery pieces, many of them towed by vehicles rather than self-propelled. These guns have a lower calibre (the size of shell fired), shorter range and are more vulnerable to counter-battery fire because they take longer to deploy. It is the artillery cover which has made the Russian defences so formidable: when that is reduced to a negligible amount then it is a question of time before the Russian lines are broken.

Ukraine is doing its best to take the enemy apart while keeping its own losses as small as possible. This will inevitably be a slow process, but is a much more intelligent approach than that seen from the Russians throughout the war. Hence my optimism. I hope that is is justified.

[Dave2002]

Is the bridge to Crimea still usable? - the Americans are reported as having delivered some longer range missiles so possibly there may be some progress but at present it does seem like a war of attrition at a cost in lives approaching WW1 levels - the rebuilding of Ukraine will require significant money and time but the infrastructure to handle it will not be there.

The bridge is still usable - though has been damaged on several occasions. Probably it is out of range of the current stock of long range missiles if they are to operate from within the areas under Ukrainian control.

[Frances_iom]

Is the bridge to Crimea still usable? - the Americans are reported as having delivered some longer range missiles so possibly there may be some progress but at present it does seem like a war of attrition at a cost in lives approaching WW1 levels - the rebuilding of Ukraine will require significant money and time but the infrastructure to handle it will not be there.

[JasonPalmer]

As time progresses ukraine will become stronger and russia weaker.

[Dave2002]

This seems very convincing to me. I would add that Ukraine is also destroying Russia's ability to continue to fight by destroying artillery, armoured vehicles etc. as well as trained soldiers in great numbers.

The Ukrainians appear to have destroyed some airbases quite effectively recently, presumably to limit the Russian's ability to launch air borne missiles, and push them to the extremities of the disputed territories.

[Historian]

Been quite a bit since anything was posted - rather like the rest of the media Ukraine has been placed here in the forget about it pile.

You are quite right: I don't like obtruding but will post more often. Thank you to you and others for keeping the discussions going with a variety of different ideas and viewpoints.

[Ein Heldenleben]

Very sorry not to have replied before: it's a very good question. I will restrict myself to describing some possible alternatives portraying a possible military defeat for Putin.

In an ideal world, Mr. Putin would see sense tomorrow (or at least in the next few days), declare 'victory' and start to retreat from all areas of Ukraine back to within Russia's borders. This would be followed by talks, probably overseen by a third party, resulting in an end to all hostilities.

That will not happen, sadly.

Next scenario: faced with the slow but certain destruction of his armed forces (and therefore the basis of his power) by the collapse of the southern front in Zaporizhia, Putin eventually decides to cut his losses (say Spring 2024) and pull back to the neck of Crimea and the other areas in the Donbas taken illegally in 2014 (when the conflict effectively began). This would be the product of much hard fighting and heavy casualties. However, faced with the prospect of a catastrophic military defeat, he then agrees to a ceasefire on the basis of a subsequent withdrawal within Russia's pre-war borders. A variation on this would be to abandon Crimea - which would be untenable once Ukraine took back Melitopol, Mariupol and the Azov sea coast - and hold on to the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk 'republics'. Ukraine might then decide that there was enough regained to agree to negotiations. This seems unlikely to me but it's a possibility.

Most likely, in my moderately informed opinion, is a continued long struggle well into 2024 at least, if not 2025 (assuming sufficient military/financial etc. support from the US and European supporters) in which Putin's army continues to see its equipment slowly destroyed. (It is true that Russia has an overall manpower advantage in theory, but that's not going to save them when they have run out of artillery and armoured vehicles, not to mention fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters.) The relatively successful Russian defence lines of this summer will not be able to be duplicated indefinitely as the minefields and field defences require effective artillery and armoured support. Eventually the Russians will be forced to retreat - how fast depends to some extent on how strongly they have fortified the defences behind the tough 'crust' which the Ukrainians have been slowly breaking up around Robotyne (among other places). Tokmak and other key logistic centres will fall, followed by Melitopol, Mariupol and the northern coast of the Sea of Azov.

Russia will then have a choice of trying to hold on to the Crimea or creating a new defensive line to protect the Donbas areas and keep hold of them. Assuming that the supporters of Ukraine remain resolute I don't see how Russia could keep Crimea. In theory they might have a better chance of retaining the areas in south-east Ukraine.

I hope that this makes some sense, albeit in a slightly limited way. My apologies for not having looked at the 'bigger picture' i.e. what happens to Putin and Russia once they have been defeated in Ukraine.

Interesting . The impression one gets from the papers is that the Ukraine army is having trouble breaching well prepared Russia defences and that Putin is holding on for a Trump re-election and a decline in US support . I’ve been struggling to find a single broadsheet Pundit predicting significant Ukrainian gains. You seem much more positive . In these wars of attrition sudden collapse is always a distinct possibility. Russian infantry morale must be very low - after a while seeing your mates getting killed in a country you don’t get care much about gets to you.

[Historian]

Forget any notion of Ukraine reaching the gates of Moscow, that will not happen. A Putin defeat will come about when Ukraine has sufficiently degraded his armed forces in such a way that the Russians are unable to continue the war. This can be achieved by destroying logistics, that is the ability of Russia to feed, clothe and arm their forces. This is evidently what Ukraine is trying to do.

If Putin cannot feed, clothe or arm his military then his ability to prosecute the war will, hopefully, be sufficient to see his regime so weakened that he will be overthrown. Victory in war is not necessarily about reclaiming territory.

This is my two'penn'orth contribution anyway.

This seems very convincing to me. I would add that Ukraine is also destroying Russia's ability to continue to fight by destroying artillery, armoured vehicles etc. as well as trained soldiers in great numbers.

[Historian]

How do you see this ending, what does a Putin defeat look like to you?

Very sorry not to have replied before: it's a very good question. I will restrict myself to describing some possible alternatives portraying a possible military defeat for Putin.

In an ideal world, Mr. Putin would see sense tomorrow (or at least in the next few days), declare 'victory' and start to retreat from all areas of Ukraine back to within Russia's borders. This would be followed by talks, probably overseen by a third party, resulting in an end to all hostilities.

That will not happen, sadly.

Next scenario: faced with the slow but certain destruction of his armed forces (and therefore the basis of his power) by the collapse of the southern front in Zaporizhia, Putin eventually decides to cut his losses (say Spring 2024) and pull back to the neck of Crimea and the other areas in the Donbas taken illegally in 2014 (when the conflict effectively began). This would be the product of much hard fighting and heavy casualties. However, faced with the prospect of a catastrophic military defeat, he then agrees to a ceasefire on the basis of a subsequent withdrawal within Russia's pre-war borders. A variation on this would be to abandon Crimea - which would be untenable once Ukraine took back Melitopol, Mariupol and the Azov sea coast - and hold on to the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk 'republics'. Ukraine might then decide that there was enough regained to agree to negotiations. This seems unlikely to me but it's a possibility.

Most likely, in my moderately informed opinion, is a continued long struggle well into 2024 at least, if not 2025 (assuming sufficient military/financial etc. support from the US and European supporters) in which Putin's army continues to see its equipment slowly destroyed. (It is true that Russia has an overall manpower advantage in theory, but that's not going to save them when they have run out of artillery and armoured vehicles, not to mention fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters.) The relatively successful Russian defence lines of this summer will not be able to be duplicated indefinitely as the minefields and field defences require effective artillery and armoured support. Eventually the Russians will be forced to retreat - how fast depends to some extent on how strongly they have fortified the defences behind the tough 'crust' which the Ukrainians have been slowly breaking up around Robotyne (among other places). Tokmak and other key logistic centres will fall, followed by Melitopol, Mariupol and the northern coast of the Sea of Azov.

Russia will then have a choice of trying to hold on to the Crimea or creating a new defensive line to protect the Donbas areas and keep hold of them. Assuming that the supporters of Ukraine remain resolute I don't see how Russia could keep Crimea. In theory they might have a better chance of retaining the areas in south-east Ukraine.

I hope that this makes some sense, albeit in a slightly limited way. My apologies for not having looked at the 'bigger picture' i.e. what happens to Putin and Russia once they have been defeated in Ukraine.

[Petrushka]

What does a Putin defeat look like to you?

Forget any notion of Ukraine reaching the gates of Moscow, that will not happen. A Putin defeat will come about when Ukraine has sufficiently degraded his armed forces in such a way that the Russians are unable to continue the war. This can be achieved by destroying logistics, that is the ability of Russia to feed, clothe and arm their forces. This is evidently what Ukraine is trying to do.

If Putin cannot feed, clothe or arm his military then his ability to prosecute the war will, hopefully, be sufficient to see his regime so weakened that he will be overthrown. Victory in war is not necessarily about reclaiming territory.

This is my two'penn'orth contribution anyway.

[french frank]

what does a Putin defeat look like to you?

I wonder that too.

[Dave2002]

This is exactly right. It's just silly to imagine that Ukraine is going to take Crimea and the Donbas. Mr Putin has the manpower to go on forever, but Ukraine clearly does not and by foolishly cheering them on we are sending more innocent men into the slaughter machine - exactly as Mr Putin hopes. There should be peace talks and Ukraine should defend its current borders. Once they have joined NATO then any Russian invasion beyond Crimea etc. will result in a catastrophe for Putin.

Things are currently - it seems - evenly balanced - so any outcome is still possible. It is not totally unbelievable that Ukraine could stave off continued Russian assaults and even take back Crimea. In the past Finland repelled Russian ingressions successfully - though it took a long while, and FInland has far fewer people than Ukraine. Clearly Russia still has many more people, but the evidence so far is that not all of them really want to fight, and up to now they haven't been very good at it. Sadly the Russian leadership seems to see its people as disposable.

I don't think I'd want to bet either way on an eventual outcome, but I think it's far too early to rule out any possibility, even if at present there may be an almost stalemate situation. If the Ukrainians want to continue fighting, as they seem to do, then telling them they shouldn't seems wrong, though telling them they should if the fight is really hopeless would perhaps also be wrong.

[teamsaint]

This is exactly right. It's just silly to imagine that Ukraine is going to take Crimea and the Donbas. Mr Putin has the manpower to go on forever, but Ukraine clearly does not and by foolishly cheering them on we are sending more innocent men into the slaughter machine - exactly as Mr Putin hopes. There should be peace talks and Ukraine should defend its current borders. Once they have joined NATO then any Russian invasion beyond Crimea etc. will result in a catastrophe for Putin.

I’m not actually sure that either side has the manpower to go on forever. I would certainly want to check out the demographics and effects of the war on available manpower.