German Strategic Thinking: WWI

[aeolium]

Hastings and others think that while the sentiment of many in the Cabinet was for war, the British Public, would not have
Supported it. The Belgian invasion galvanized Popular Sentiment against the Germans. Up until the eve of the War, the main preoccupation in England was the issue of Irish Home Rule.

I think that understates the degree of popular anti-German sentiment already present in Britain even before Germany's invasion of Belgium. This had been stoked up in all kinds of media: popular literature, children's books and magazines, the popular press. There was the spy novel (Erskine Childers' The Riddle of the Sands); the invasion novel (Le Queux's The Invasion of 1910 which was a phenomenal best-seller in 1906); spy and adventure stories such as those of Sexton Blake in boys' magazines; the virulent and consistent anti-German tone of popular papers like the Daily Mail in the years leading up to the war. "Next to the Kaiser", wrote the editor and journalist A.G. Gardiner, "Lord Northcliffe [the Daily Mail proprietor] has done more than any other living man to bring about the war." British sentiment did not turn against Germany as a result of Germany's invasion of Belgium: it was already primed for conflict.

[richardfinegold]

I think that understates the degree of popular anti-German sentiment already present in Britain even before Germany's invasion of Belgium. This had been stoked up in all kinds of media: popular literature, children's books and magazines, the popular press. There was the spy novel (Erskine Childers' The Riddle of the Sands); the invasion novel (Le Queux's The Invasion of 1910 which was a phenomenal best-seller in 1906); spy and adventure stories such as those of Sexton Blake in boys' magazines; the virulent and consistent anti-German tone of popular papers like the Daily Mail in the years leading up to the war. "Next to the Kaiser", wrote the editor and journalist A.G. Gardiner, "Lord Northcliffe [the Daily Mail proprietor] has done more than any other living man to bring about the war." British sentiment did not turn against Germany as a result of Germany's invasion of Belgium: it was already primed for conflict.

From what I've read, there was an antipathy to Germany, but there was also a strong antipathy to the repressive Russian monarchy as well. It isn't at all clear that Britian would have entered the conflict if the primary c lash was between the Germans and the Russians

[Historian]

My apologies for this belated contribution; I was away when this thread began.

To come back to richardfinegold's opening points, I don't think Germany wanted a two-front war but, given the alliance system which grew up in the early part of the twentieth century, they had no choice. As they had to choose which front to concentrate on, the German staff worked on several reasonable assumptions which proved incorrect. The Germans assumed that Russia would take a much longer time than France to be in a position to attack Germany. They believed that Britain would not go to war over a (relatively) brief incursion into Belgium. They assumed that Belgian resistance would either not take place or would be of minimal importance. Finally, they underestimated the effects of what Clausewitz termed 'friction' - the process by which campaign plans are affected by the unforeseen and also by such factors as the weather, growing tiredness of troops etc.

In the event, Russia attacked East Prussia much sooner than anticipated (which let to some weakening of the German's western offensive. Despite having no formal military agreement with France, Britain did go to war over Belgium (among other reasons). Belgian resistance was much stronger than anticipated and this, together with strong resistance from the B.E.F. and the French forces in N.E. France, slowed the German advance.

For all sorts of reasons, the French were always going to undertake a massive offensive against Germany. This would necessitate a major German defensive effort in the West, which might have failed. In the circumstances I am not sure the German planners had much of a choice.

I would agree with you that the plan you outline might have been successful, but it relies upon the French not attacking in full strength, which was not a realistic basis on which to plan.

[richardfinegold]

My apologies for this belated contribution; I was away when this thread began.

To come back to richardfinegold's opening points, I don't think Germany wanted a two-front war but, given the alliance system which grew up in the early part of the twentieth century, they had no choice. As they had to choose which front to concentrate on, the German staff worked on several reasonable assumptions which proved incorrect. The Germans assumed that Russia would take a much longer time than France to be in a position to attack Germany. They believed that Britain would not go to war over a (relatively) brief incursion into Belgium. They assumed that Belgian resistance would either not take place or would be of minimal importance. Finally, they underestimated the effects of what Clausewitz termed 'friction' - the process by which campaign plans are affected by the unforeseen and also by such factors as the weather, growing tiredness of troops etc.

In the event, Russia attacked East Prussia much sooner than anticipated (which let to some weakening of the German's western offensive. Despite having no formal military agreement with France, Britain did go to war over Belgium (among other reasons). Belgian resistance was much stronger than anticipated and this, together with strong resistance from the B.E.F. and the French forces in N.E. France, slowed the German advance.

For all sorts of reasons, the French were always going to undertake a massive offensive against Germany. This would necessitate a major German defensive effort in the West, which might have failed. In the circumstances I am not sure the German planners had much of a choice.

I would agree with you that the plan you outline might have been successful, but it relies upon the French not attacking in full strength, which was not a realistic basis on which to plan.

Thank you for your thoughtful reply. I agree with almost everything you stated but the one sticking point is whether the French would have made an all out Offensive in the West. They did launch several Offensives in 1914, with great loss of life, but these were done after the Germans had attacked them first. Essentially, these Offensives were Defensive in nature. I do not think that the French Public of the time, with the Socialists figuring very prominently in their Politics, would have tolerated an all out Offensive if the Germans had assumed a purely defensive posture in the West, coupled with a Diplomatic effort that would portray them as only wanting to fight the Russians who were the main protectors of the Serbs, the enemies of their Austrian Allies.

[Historian]

I do not think that the French Public of the time, with the Socialists figuring very prominently in their Politics, would have tolerated an all out Offensive if the Germans had assumed a purely defensive posture in the West, coupled with a Diplomatic effort that would portray them as only wanting to fight the Russians who were the main protectors of the Serbs, the enemies of their Austrian Allies.

I will have to check, but I am pretty certain that the French were heavily committed to support Russia if the latter were attacked. Furthermore, although there was, as you say, a great deal of anti-war feeling, there was also a determination to revenge 1870 and regain Alsace-Lorraine.

[Historian]

I will have to check, but I am pretty certain that the French were heavily committed to support Russia if the latter were attacked. Furthermore, although there was, as you say, a great deal of anti-war feeling, there was also a determination to revenge 1870 and regain Alsace-Lorraine.

According to Wikipedia (not a great fan, but it's convenient) the Franco-Russian Alliance (1894-1917) committed both countries to go to war if either were attacked by Germany, Austria-Hungary or Italy. The article includes a quote from Clark's The Sleepwalkers to the effect that the alliance was effectively a military convention.

Despite much internal opposition, I find it inconceivable that France would not have gone to war to support Russia in 1914. The case of Great Britain was different; fortunately (in my opinion) the British entered the war. However, that is another question altogether.

[richardfinegold]

According to Wikipedia (not a great fan, but it's convenient) the Franco-Russian Alliance (1894-1917) committed both countries to go to war if either were attacked by Germany, Austria-Hungary or Italy. The article includes a quote from Clark's The Sleepwalkers to the effect that the alliance was effectively a military convention.

Despite much internal opposition, I find it inconceivable that France would not have gone to war to support Russia in 1914. The case of Great Britain was different; fortunately (in my opinion) the British entered the war. However, that is another question altogether.

I don't think that France would have launched an all out von Scliefen type offensive to capture the entire German Country. They would have attacked in Alsace Lorraine in attempt to reclaim that territory and simultaneously claim they were fulfilling their treaty obligations. The Germans could have limited a Western War there while they polished off the Romanov Dynasty.

[richardfinegold]

Having now read a couple of more books on the Origins of WW I, I now understand that my OP is nonsensical. The French and Russians were assuming quite a militant and offensive posture prior to the start of the War that I think became downplayed after the War's conclusion and the demands for reperations against Germany came raining in. For the Germans to adopt a defensive stance only against the French at the start of the wAr was simply not an option.

[Historian]

I think I would go along with that analysis. Out of interest, which books did you read?

[richardfinegold]

I think I would go along with that analysis. Out of interest, which books did you read?

The most influential is Colin Clarke, previously cited. Also Margaret MacMillan, The Road To War 1914: The War That Ended Peace.

[Historian]

The most influential is Colin Clarke, previously cited. Also Margaret MacMillan, The Road To War 1914: The War That Ended Peace.

Thank you. I've read Clarke and will try to find the time to look at Macmillan. Her book on the Versailles Peace Conference was very good.

[Richard Barrett]

I've just finished reading Christopher Clark's book (is that what people mean when referring to "Colin Clarke" or is that someone else?). I came out with the impression that you really can't summarise the origins of the first world war in fewer than the 500-odd pages he uses. What I find particularly impressive is the way he makes parallels between the period before the war began and the present time, for example in comparing the Austrian ultimatum delivered to the Serbian government in 1914 with that from NATO in 1999, both clearly intended to make unacceptable demands so that a previously-planned attack could take place. Something that struck me throughout was the grotesquely jingoistic attitudes of almost all the principal players, whether politicians, soldiers or crowned heads, and how indifferent they all were to the death and destruction caused by war, as opposed to the extent to which profit and/or power could be gained from it.

[Historian]

I've just finished reading Christopher Clark's book (is that what people mean when referring to "Colin Clarke" or is that someone else?). I came out with the impression that you really can't summarise the origins of the first world war in fewer than the 500-odd pages he uses..[..] Something that struck me throughout was the grotesquely jingoistic attitudes of almost all the principal players, whether politicians, soldiers or crowned heads, and how indifferent they all were to the death and destruction caused by war, as opposed to the extent to which profit and/or power could be gained from it.

I agree that it shows very well how complicated everything was, which contrasts strongly with some of the frankly unhistorical views aired earlier this year. Suspect that 'Colin Clarke' is probably a misremembering of Christopher Clark. There is a Colin Clarke, but he was a D.H. Lawrence scholar, it seems. As for the indifference of the 'powers that were' at the time, there certainly seemed to be a very widespread belief that the war was inevitable and even necessary. Had they understood quite how much death and destruction would ensue, including the downfall of many of the autocracies, perhaps they would have been more circumspect.

[Richard Barrett]

Had they understood quite how much death and destruction would ensue, including the downfall of many of the autocracies, perhaps they would have been more circumspect.

Yes and this is a point that Clark himself makes in his closing remarks, but, continuing from that moment, once it did become clear that the Western front was basically a pointless bloodbath, you would think that if those in charge of the warring sides had any trace of civilisation they would have tried to find a way to call it to a halt.

Do you happen to know of a good way of continuing the story from where Clark leaves off?

[Historian]

I would disagree with you (to an extent) about the Western Front being "a pointless bloodbath". Ultimately, I believe it played a major part in the defeat of the Central Powers. However, whether that was worth the price paid is, to say the least, debateable.

As for calling an end to the slaughter, it eventually became a case of "I am in blood stepped in so far that, should I wade no more, returning was as tedious as go o'er". The demands of alliance politics, increasing dominance of military over civilian leadership, even the voices of a majority of the home populations, all militated against a negotiated settlement, despite various attempts. Few people seemed to have realised how long industrialised nations, with conscript armies, could go on fighting.

I must admit that I am not fully up to speed with the growing literature of the First World War; so much has been published recently. Which aspect were you particularly interested in? I am sure members will have intelligent suggestions to make.